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Much of the growth in the distance learning market
will come from corporate training.14 University-based
education will undoubtedly be more successful for
attracting students in those fields where employers cur-
rently provide funds for continuing education. 5 Further,
unlike the early days of distance education when the
unlimited potential of distance education was one of
the many overly hyped fields on the Internet, today,
traditional colleges are
successfully expanding
their base using dis- T H Etensionbetw
tance education courses, as creators an
even as most for-profit property seems to be
entities have struggled new areas of distance
or gone bankrupt. 6
In addition, it should
be noted that for the traditional college or university there
may be little or no financial savings in the delivery of
class content via the Internet, except the inherent cost of
capital expenditures for classroom space, although that
may be significant at some institutions.17 The primary
corporate savings are in scale-the ability to have the
same materials viewed by hundreds of students instead
of dozens-and efficiency, because the class can often
be held at the student's office or work desk, rather than
at an offsite location. For more complex educational
objectives, involving a significant amount of student-
teacher interaction, schools tend to cap the class size well
below the level allowed during live classroom experi-
ences, further eroding any potential financial windfall. 8
Further, although there has been strong interest in
this arena from for-profit companies eager to become
involved in this multi-billion dollar industry, no com-
panies are currently successful in this arena as for-
profit ventures. 9 Ultimately, some businesses will
be successful financially, just as University of Phoe-
nix and others have been successful in for-profit edu-
cation generally. Nonetheless, it will not amount
to the sort of windfall anticipated at its inception.2 °
Part of the failure to succeed financially may stem
from a lack of marketing strength and the need to
market against a deeply embedded competitor in the
nonprofit, academic community. Among vendors, very
little emphasis has been placed on marketing to the
general public. E-College and Peterson's have been
commonly cited as the two sites most readily used to
find courses online.21 As of yet, no portal for online
education presently exists that does much to serve the
distance learning community. In contrast with the
original, targeted course design and content offered by
University of Phoenix, class aggregator websites such
as that offered by Western Governors University
tend to list everything, overwhelming the interested
applicant with too many, undifferentiated choices.
On the other hand, the
lack of success at Fathom
en academic institutions has been attributed to its
d consumers of intellectual expensive, long courses. 22
most directly felt in the Perhaps the real dis-
e
ic
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education. tinction can be found
in the two areas of
strength-corporate
training and community colleges.23 These two learning
environments have much in common, particularly the
identification of clear goals and immediately applicable
skills. For students engaged in training or education
that has immediate and concrete application, motivation
and retention increase substantially.24 Abstract course
content provided by the British Museum may be interest-
ing, but Fathom has found no market for such content. In
contrast, the University of Phoenix has an estimated 27,000
online enrollees for its highly focused, practical classes. 26
B. Distance Learning Tools and Strat-
egies
The intersection between distance education and intel-
lectual property requires that each be identified and
defined as a prerequisite to analyzing their interaction.
Distance learning, in particular, can mean almost any-
thing.27 As the Register of Copyrights reported, "There
is no 'typical' digital distance education course. 28 It
encompasses everything from traditional correspon-
dence courses (where materials are mailed to the student
who completes the reading and returns an examination
or paper for evaluation) to a classroom of students who
happen to meet at a location somewhere off the univer-
sity's primary facility while being taught interactively
by a faculty member located back at the university. 29
The Register of Copyrights has adopted a broad
definition of distance education, categorizing "distance
education [as] a form of education in which students are
separated from their instructors by time and/or space."30
€
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There is, I think, no point in the philosophy
of progressive education which is sounder
than its emphasis upon the importance of
the participation of the learner in the for-
mation of the purposes which direct his
activities in the learning process
-John Dewey
O this learning, what a thing it is!2
-William Shakespeare
I. Introduction
As an industry sector, educational institutions are ambiv-
alent towards intellectual property, serving as an incuba-
tor for new work, a significant repository of intellectual
property ownership and as a primary consumer of other
parties' intellectual property. Universities are increas-
ingly participating in the expansion of intellectual prop-
erty development by sharing in revenues derived from
patents developed on campus or creating for-profit
subsidiaries to exploit the value in the materials cre-
ated.3 At the same time, schools and colleges are
pushing for greater legal protection to freely exploit
copyrighted works and other intellectual property.4
As a starting point, it should be noted that all course
materials are intellectual property, including the copy-
righted books and materials used by the students;5 the
trademarks associated with the school or institution;6
and the notes or lecture materials of faculty members
as written or scribed by students.7 Distance education
tools only add to this mix by providing copyrighted
software to deliver course content; 8 copyrighted soft-
ware and Internet sites providing content and services;9
trademarked institutional brands promoting the quality
of education and validity of the content on each school's
website; 0 copyrighted video or audio broadcasts of
the course sessions in both real time and on-demand;
copyrighted course content created by the students;
copyrighted and trademarked materials distributed
in the class by students; copyrighted archived mate-
rial; links to third party, copyrighted and trade-
marked materials; and publicity rights for the
identities of persons featured in published advertising.
The dual nature of schools-as both creators and
consumers of intellectual property-must be taken
into account when creating policies for the creation,
adoption and use of intellectual property in the develop-
ing, distance education marketplace. The purpose of
this Article is to set forth the intellectual property law
issues that academic institutions need to consider when
establishing policies for distance education programs.
Both the law and business practices in this field are in
great flux; therefore, the statements included herein are
only accurate as of its date of initial publication. This
Article should provide only an introduction to the legal
topics that arise in the distance education context.
Any individual using the materials and information
presented must always research original sources of
authority and update the information to ensure accuracy
when dealing with a specific client or firm matter.
II. Overview of the Distance Educa-
tion Marketplace.
A. Economics
The growth of distance education continues to expand
at a pace unthinkable even four years ago. Conservative
estimates suggest that at least 75 percent of two-year
and four-year colleges have begun to provide at least a
smattering of courses online1" and many opportunities
exist to earn a bachelor's degree, master's degree, Ph.D.
or even a J.D. online-often at regionally or profession-
ally accredited institutions. Although the market for dis-
tance learning in education is unknown, the projections
are compelling. For example, Merrill Lynch projects the
U.S. online market in higher education will surge to $7 bil-
lion, from $1.2 billion, by 2003.12 Other examples abound:
According to technology research firm IDC,
online schooling accounts for about $2.2 bil-
lion of the $19.5 billion spent on corporate
education and training this year (that excludes
training that companies deliver in-house to
their own employees). IDC estimates that
by 2003, e-learning or Web-based training will
account for $11.4 billion of the nearly $30 bil-
lion business education market. And in a recent
survey of 40 of the world's largest corpora-
tions, Forrester Research found that all but one
had online training initiatives already in place. 3
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The Register of Copyrights focused its study on "the
delivery of instruction with a teacher active in deter-
mining pace and content, as opposed to unstructured
learning from resource materials. 31 The distinguish-
ing characteristic of distance learning or education is
mediated instruction by a faculty member, who serves
to shape the learning process. This is distinct from
a resource center of materials that can be used by
the student without supervision or direction.32 While
this latter category of educational services may also
serve many educational needs, the primary focus of
the law and regulation remains on mediated activities.
Increasingly, the Internet has become the medium
of choice because of its low delivery costs and
simultaneous (and asynchronous) communication
capabilities.3 Distance learning on the Internet
is comprised of a number of features.34  A
partial list of those features includes the following:
1. E-mail (which a person can use to send a mes-
sage (or software files) to one or more recipi-
ents);
2. Online "library" (collected materials and
resources available from the website);
3. Links (connection to other websites or electronic
resources provided by third parties);
4. Bulletin boards (asynchronous message boards
for participants to post comments as well as
share computer files (which may include docu-
ments, sound recordings, graphics or soft-
ware));
5. Chat rooms (synchronous or live text-based com-
munications among the participants);
6. Listservs (group e-mail in which every
participant can both send and receive messages
and files by communicating with a single, central
address);
7. Streaming audio and video (live audio or audio-
visual broadcast from the lecturer to the partici-
pants);
8. Desktop video conferencing (live two-way video
and audio conferencing);
9. Automated examination and evaluation soft-
ware); and
10. Search engines that gather information available
on the Internet.35
These tools allow the school or instructor to design
a course meeting appropriate instructional design goals
for the topic of the course.36 Nonetheless, the underlying
goals are-or should be-determined by pedagogical or
educational objectives.37 "Instructional design is critical
to distance education and planning for effective teaching
is needed for learning to occur."38 Notwithstanding the
improvements in technology, this is the daunting task. As
one analyst of the technology commented, "[c] ontent cre-
ation remains a labor intensive task which requires spe-
cialized knowledge of Instructional Design principles."3 9
C. Distance Learning Services
Distance education may be used alone or in combination
with a classroom environment. In its simplest form,
students can exchange e-mail to collaborate on home-
work or out-of-class projects. At the other extreme, a
degree may be offered entirely online4 0 allowing students
living throughout the world to attend asynchronously
by meeting the objectives of each instructional module.
The appropriateness of these tools depends on the objec-
tives of the course and instructor.41 In undergraduate
education, for example, the goals are often focused
on socialization, collaboration and community building
skills, which are taught through the learning of a (some-
times unrelated) subject matter.42 For advanced profes-
sional education orjob-skills training, the interpersonal
development occurs at the workplace rather than the class-
room, so these objectives are not included in the process. 43
The key to effective distance education is to identify
the objectives explicitly and select tools that support those
skills, rather than to choose tools or the medium first. As
then Secretary of Education Richard Riley commented,
"[t]his debate has never been about technology. It has
been about what our children have the opportunity
to do. It's about connecting students to a whole new
world of learning resources and offering the mind the
opportunities to expand and take on a new and chal-
lenging future.' ' 4 Many of the strategic problems asso-
ciated with distance learning tools are the poor fit
between the pedagogical goals and the tools selected.45
Ill. Legal Issues Involving Distance
Education Tools and Services
A. Copyright Background
Copyright provides the author of an original work the sole
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power to sell or transfer the rights to the work. Subject
to certain limitations, such as fair use, the copyright
holder retains a monopoly over the work. The subject
matter of copyright is the expression of ideas, rather than
the ideas themselves. 6 Copyright protection subsists
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.47 Works of authorship include
the following categories: (1) literary works; (2)
musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying
music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural works; (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.48
Copyright protects only the expression of the work-
the writing style and detailed plot of the story, but
not ideas, procedures, processes or facts.4 9 Copyright
protects the creativity of the expression, but does not
give any author a monopoly on the facts or ideas pre-
sented. No copyright in course materials, therefore,
can preclude another faculty member from creating
her own materials to teach the same subject matter.
The exclusive rights of the copyright holder are cat-
egorized into seven distinct rights. Generally, these
rights provide the copyright owner with exclusive power
of (1) reproduction or copying; (2) adaptation or the
creation of derivative works; (3) distribution by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or
lending; (4) public performance of literary, musical,
dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (5)
public display. In addition, two categories of protection
are specific to certain works. In the case of sound
recordings, the copyright owner (typically a record label)
has the right to perform the copyrighted work pub-
licly by means of a digital audio transmission." In
the case of a work of visual art (made in a series
of fewer than 200 copies), the creator receives the
additional rights to receive credit for creating the
work and to ensure that the work is not mutilated or
destroyed by the owners of each copy of the work.5
B. Copyright Mechanics
For works created after January 1, 1978, the term
of copyright lasts for the life of the author, plus 70
years. 2 If the work is made as a work for hire, then
the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years
from creation, whichever is less.53 This is also the term
provided for anonymous and pseudonymous works. 4
For works created prior to January 1, 1978, the copy-
right term is more difficult to calculate. United States
works published prior to January 1, 192311 are in the
public domain, and thus receive no copyright protec-
tion. 6 Works published between January 1, 1964 and
December 31, 1977 have a copyright term of 95 years. 7
Works published between January 1, 1923 and December
31, 1963 had an original copyright term of 28 years
which could be extended by an additional 67 years if the
copyright owner renewed the copyright 8.5  Because
many works were not renewed, the copyright in those
works lapsed and the materials are now in the public
domain. For works published during this period,
however, no assumption can be made that a given
work is in the public domain, so each work must
be researched to determine its copyright status.5 9
In addition to the requirements that works published
prior to January 1, 1963 be properly renewed, there are
other rules that continue to apply from former law. The
most important of these is the statutory formalities of
copyright. There are three steps for formally protecting
a published work. Under current law, however, none of
these serves as a condition of receiving copyright, and the
importance of the formalities has lessened considerably
during the past twenty years. The first requirement is
notice, which includes the copyright symbol "©" (or the
word or abbreviation for copyright) along with the year
of publication and the name of the copyright holder.60
This should be featured prominently in a place a viewer
would expect to look (e.g., the title page of a book).6'
The second formality is registration, which requires
that a filing fee (presently $30.00), the appropriate form
and a copy of the work be submitted to the Copyright
Office.62 While this is no longer required, it does provide
some benefits if a legal dispute ever arises regarding
the work, including prima facie evidence of the facts in
the copyright application 63 and statutory damages and
attorneys fees if the suit is filed in a timely fashion.64
Although the registration of current works is no longer
mandatory, this has only been the case since Febru-
ary 28, 1989 when the Copyright Act was amended to
provide for adherence by the United States to the Berne
Convention. For works published between January 1,
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1923 and February 28, 1989, the work must have been
properly registered within three months of its publication
to receive copyright protection.61 "[T]he statutory rules
regarding copyright notice that were in effect at the
time of the first publication of a work determine the
copyright status of that work; failure to comply with
those rules thrust the work in the public domain. 66
The third and final formality remains mandatory
even under the present statute. The Library of Congress
is entitled under the Copyright Act to receive two copies
of the best edition of every published work made in
the United States.67 This deposit is generally made as
part of the registration process. In the situation where a
copyright holder of a published work elects not to register
the work, the copyright owner is still obligated to submit
copies to the Library of Congress. 6 If the copyright owner
refuses to send copies after receiving a demand letter,
then the copyright office can levy substantial fines.69
C. Ownership and Transfer of Course
Materials and Websites
As a general rule, copyright vests in the author of a
work at the time it is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression. 0 One significant exception to that rule
is the "work-for-hire" doctrine, under which works
in two categories are owned by the employer or the
party that contracted for the work to be created.
In the situation where a work is specially ordered or
commissioned, the copyright may vest in the party com-
missioning the work, rather than the party who authored
it?0 In such a situation, an independent contractor or
other non-employee may assign the authorship in a work
so long as two conditions are met.72 First, there must
be a signed agreement among the parties that provides
that the work is to be considered a work made for hire.
No oral understanding or course of conduct between the
parties will be sufficient!' It must be in writing. Second,
the work must fall into one of nine categories set forth
in the statute: (1) a contribution to a collective work;
(2) a motion picture or other audiovisual work; (3) a
translation; (4) a supplementary work; (5) a compilation;
(6) an instructional text; (7) a test; (8) answer material
for a test; and (9) an atlas.74 Any instructor, therefore,
can assign the authorship of his or her instructional
texts or audiovisual works (this will generally includes
websites and other content used for online distance
education) to the school by signing an agreement
which includes the appropriate transfer language!'
As a separate basis for transferring authorship to
the school as the employer, copyright law provides that
works prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment are the copyrighted work of the
employer rather than the employee 6 To meet this test,
there are also two criteria. At the outset, the person must
be an employee, which typically means paid a salary,
with proper tax withholding and employment benefits?7
For more difficult cases, there are a list of factors that
have been identified by the Supreme Court 8 This list of
factors takes on significance primarily for adjuncts and
part-time faculty, who may be treated as independent
contractors for purposes of employment benefits and
federal tax treatment. When the faculty member is an
independent contractor, the significance of the
right to control becomes increasingly important
in determining copyright ownership 9  This deter-
mination is highly fact-specific and subjective.
As a result, reliance on the employer-employee
relationship will create significant problems for
both part-time faculty and educational institutions.
Adjunct faculty generally will not be employees under
the Supreme Court's test, because they are not regular
salaried employees receiving benefits. If the school
wishes to own the materials of its adjunct faculty, the
school must enter into a written agreement stating that
the courses are work for hire as specially commissioned
works, rather than in the course of the adjunct's employ-
ment. A better alternative is for the adjunct to
sign an assignment of copyright to the academic
institution.80 An adjunct who teaches at more
than one institution should consider licensing the
use of the materials to each institution on a non-
exclusive basis, retaining ownership and the ability
to develop new materials from semester to semester.
D. Teacher's Exception to the Work-
for-Hire Doctrine
In addition to the issue of employment status, a second
question to be answered is whether the materials
have been prepared in the scope of the person's
employment.81 This issue has generated significant
consternation among faculty members who fear
encroachment into their autonomy in scholarship
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and having to share revenue generated from projects
that may create commercially viable products.82
For class assignments that are part of a full-time
faculty member's normal teaching schedule, both criteria
embodied in the 1976 Copyright Act are typically going
to be met. The employment status satisfies the first
element of the test, and the nature and purpose for
which the teaching materials are prepared supports the
second element that the work be prepared in the scope
of employment.83 Few educational cases have analyzed
this issue. Typically, however, even if the instructor has
not been directly supervised by the school, classroom
and testing materials are used directly for the benefit
of the institution's students. In looking at the copyright
ownership of a course outline, one lower court explained
that a course outline "was connected directly with the
work for which [the teacher] was employed to do and was
fairly and reasonably incidental to his employment."84
Direct supervision was not required."' Further, the
notion that a common law tradition survives, despite the
language of the statute, may be undermined when the
academic tradition that gave rise to that tradition is itself
transforming through the growth of new teaching media. 6
Full-time faculty members may also retain certain
ownership in works they create, if those works are not
within the scope of their employment or if the parties
agree to another arrangement in writing.8 7 Under a
common law exception to the work-for-hire doctrine
known as the teacher's exception, work-for-hire had not
applied to faculty members' academic writings under the
1909 Copyright Act.88 Significant controversy T
exists whether this exception survives the enact- '-T
ment of the Copyright Act of 1976. For most
tenure-track faculty positions, academic writ- mUst
ing remains a requirement of the job.89 Faculty
members often receive mentoring by peers, the
secretarial and administrative support and in th
sometimes receive stipends or other additional
compensation.9" As such, the academic writings
are part of the employment because they are obli-
gations undertaken in order for the faculty member
to receive tenure.91  Nonetheless, most colleges
and universities have historically never sought own-
ership of their faculties' academic writings and
have either waived claims of ownership through
collective bargaining or through common practice.
In two decisions, the Seventh Circuit has strongly
suggested that the doctrine does or should survive the
re-codification of the 1976 Copyright Act.92 Neither case
represents strong legal authority, because in both cases
the court was addressing this topic even though it was
not in dispute between the parties. More importantly,
the emphasis was on "academic books and articles."93
The court stated that "the universal assumption and
practice was ... that the right to copyright such
writing belonged to the teacher rather than to the
college or university [because the college or uni-
versity] is poorly equipped to exploit their writings,
whether through publication or otherwise
Such an assertion by the court is baseless and unsup-
ported. It ignores the value of research to an academic
research institution, the importance of scholarship in the
development and training of the intuition's employees
and creates a perverse incentive for universities to com-
mercialize scholarship as a means of demonstrating
ownership in the faculty's work product. Despite
the increasingly important role scholarship plays
throughout higher education, 95 the recitation of the
need for a continuing teacher's exception does not
flow either from the text of the statute or the
institutional realities of the academic community.
The reasons for providing a teacher's exception to the
work-for-hire doctrine flow primarily from the desire to
provide faculty sufficient autonomy from their employers
and a realization that the relationship between scholar-
ship and incentives at most institutions is a very poor fit,
_i dual-nature of schools-as both creators
1and consumers of intellectual property-
be taken into account when creating policies for
-reation, adoption and use of intellectual properly
e developing, distance education marketplace.
particularly for faculty who have achieved tenure and are
no longer directly measured by their scholarly output.96
To solve these problems, some school policy manuals
incorporate the teacher's exception into school policy,
disclaiming the employer's copyright. This further
indicates that any custom underlying the teacher's excep-
tion has been replaced by negotiated academic policies.97
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The Copyright Act specifically provides that the transfer
of copyright by the employee may be altered by the
parties, so long as "the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them."98
E. Joint Works
Websites and other course materials are often developed
by more than one person. Assuming the works were
not created as works for hire, the copyright in such
works will be jointly owned. A joint work is "a
work prepared by two or more authors with the inten-
tions that their contribution be merged into insepa-
rable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. "99
Again the legal standard has two elements. First,
each of the parties must be an author, meaning that he
or she must have contributed some original material
to the joint work. For example, if one author writes
lyrics and the other writes songs, their collaboration is a
joint work. Similarly, it is ajoint work when one person
writes functional computer code and another provides
the graphic design to implement its use on a website.
The second requirement is that both parties intend the
work to be ajoint, collaborative effort. This element is
included to protect an author from losing exclusive own-
ership to editors or other individuals who often provide
essential but relatively modest changes to the work."'
F. Transfers of Copyright: The Practi-
cal Alternative to the Work-for-Hire
Doctrine
Copyright is often described as a "bundle of rights" that
can be separated into any number of exclusive and non-
exclusive transfers.' This bundle can also be divided
into smaller sticks and twigs, if done using very carefully
crafted exclusive licenses. As professor Nimmer has
explained, "[a] n exclusive license, even if it is 'limited in
time or place of effect,' is equated with an assignment,
and each is considered to be a 'transfer' of copyright
ownership."'0 These exclusive rights can be granted for
a specific period of time, for a geographic location, or
for a particular use.0 3 "Indeed, there would appear to
be no limit on how narrow the scope of licensed rights
may be and still constitute a 'transfer' of ownership, as
long as the rights thus licensed are 'exclusive.' 104 So,
for example, an adjunct professor could create an online
course that she licensed to University X for two years,
granting University X exclusive rights to the course
materials in its state for undergraduate education. That
license would still permit the adjunct professor to license
the online course to colleges outside of University
X's state, to license the course to high schools or gradu-
ate schools, and to enter into any other form of licens-
ing relationship at the end of the two year period.
For the transfer to be exclusive, it must be "in writing
and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such
owner's duly authorized agent."'0 5 This is best done with
a signed contract, but a series of letters may suffice,
since the statute requires only that the granting party
sign the transfer. Non-exclusive grants need not be in
writing and may be either oral or implied from conduct
(e.g., providing copies for use). 6 An oral promise to
transfer copyright exclusively cannot be enforced, but the
courts will sometimes allow at least a non-exclusive
use based on the implied transfer that such an unen-
forceable promise signifies. 7 Similarly, absent any
understanding between a school and the owner of
course materials or a website, a history of allowing
the materials to be reprinted or used in other
ways can create an implied, non-exclusive license. 108
Although seldom mentioned, this same issue applies
to copyrighted materials authored by the students in the
online setting. If the faculty member wishes to publish
the students' work on the Internet, the faculty member or
the educational institution should have express per-
mission to do so. While the student typically grants
such permission implicitly through his or her participa-
tion in the course, a student who objects may have a
legitimate claim to refuse to grant permission to the
faculty member to republish the copyrighted work online.
Assuming that the use by the faculty member of
the student's work is non-exclusive, the student need
not provide a signed authorization. 0 9 Still something
more than simple acquiescence should be relied on,
particularly if the use is going to continue beyond the
end of the student's enrollment in the course for which
the work was created. The educational institution can
adopt a policy enforced through its enrollment policies,
or each faculty member could incorporate into his or
her syllabus a statement that notifies students that their
work will be subject to a non-exclusive license to the
institution."0 The scope of this non-exclusive license
153
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should be sufficiently broad that it covers those uses
expected by the school, but not so broad that it raises
concerns about the student's interest in controlling his
or her own academic developments and scholarship."
Given recent trends that suggest teaching assistants
are increasingly beginning to make professional demands
on their academic institutions, the status of graduate stu-
dent teaching assistants should also be set forth expressly
in writing." 2 Ironically, the success of graduate students
in establishing collective bargaining rights could serve to
undermine their claims to copyright in their works, absent
an agreement that specifies ownership and licensure.
IV. Limits on the Copyright Holder's
Exclusive Rights
The exclusive rights vested in the copyright owner are
not absolute. They are subject to both practical limita-
tions and legal constraints. While tempting, educational
institutions must be particularly sensitive to the ethical
issues involved in unauthorized copying."' Presumably,
all institutions strongly disapprove of plagiarism,"'
which serves as a moral or ethical code, rather than
as a legal doctrine."5 The disapproval of plagiarism
(although inherently quite distinct from copyright) shares
a common theme with copyright in that much of the limi-
tations on copyright infringement come from a moral,
rather than legal, imperative not to steal another's work."6
This normative role for intellectual property law will
not be developed here, but it remains a central part of the
uses to which intellectual property is put by educational
institutions. Our schools establish one of the key means
for defining legally and culturally acceptable ideas
in our society. "Through nurture, socialization,
and education, we are exposed to and socialized
into some common views of the right and the
wrong, and gradually led to an ability to be at least
partly self-regulating against the standing norms
implicit, and partly explicit, in this common view.""'
In the world of academia, it is only against this norma-
tive backdrop that the battle over limitations on the
exclusive rights of copyright holders has been fought.
Copyright owners claim protection of their income and
control over the use of their work."8 Teachers repeat
frustrations regarding the cost of materials, the delays
inherent in gaining copyright clearance and the inability
to locate the correct parties from whom to acquire
permissions. " 9 Photocopy centers, Internet service
providers and school book stores are trapped in
the middle, working to accommodate all the com-
peting legitimate interests. 2 ° These competing ten-
sions have resulted in shaping the doctrine of fair use
and other exemptions to copyright exclusivity enumer-
ated in the statute. Each of these is detailed below.
A. Fair Use
Fair use serves to provide a "privilege in others than the
owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in
a reasonable manner without [the copyright holder's]
consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner ... ."12 This is a privilege that should not be
abused. Given the need for restraint, educational institu-
tions struggle to determine what are the appropriate
guidelines for using copyrighted works without express
permission. The fair use doctrine provides that "the
fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.""' This
protects the public's need to comment on a work, to
quote portions in other critical works, and to build upon
previous works.' Fair use is an equitable test that bal-
ances the copyright holder's property interests with the
public's interest in teaching, commenting and critiqu-
ing.124 The doctrine was a judicially created limitation
on the rights embodied in federal copyright law that
was not added to the statute until the codification of
the 1976 Act.125 "The fair use doctrine thus 'permits
[and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster.' "126
Procedurally, fair use is an affirmative defense to a law-
suit brought by the copyright holder for improper copying.
As such, the burden is on the copier to establish that the
amount copied was appropriate under the circumstances. 27
Borrowing materials for use in the classroom, course
materials and, particularly, websites is not uncommon 28
Despite the common occurrence of this copying, the
practice creates strong potential for copyright violations
by the instructor and the school. This is particularly
true for websites, where materials are made available to
the general public, because class-oriented websites are
not limited by passwords or other institutional mecha-
INTERNET
nisms.'a9 The posting of copyrighted material on a
website is copyright infringement, unless there is
an exception to the exclusive rights of the copyright
holder. 30 The fair use doctrine provides the greatest
flexibility for the faculty member or institution operat-
ing a website and hoping to use the work of another.
The 1976 Copyright Act codified the tra-
ditional, common law fair use doctrine
and provides four factors to consider when
assessing 'whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is [] fair':
(1) the purpose and character of the use, includ-
ing whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect
of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.13 1
Although each of these prongs is discussed by courts
when assessing any claim of fair use, the first and fourth
prongs tend to be the most important. If the copying
stymies the economic opportunity of the copyright
holder, courts are much more likely to find infringe-
ment, than if the use could not result in any economic
detriment to the copyright holder.132 While the bal-
ancing test also includes an evaluation of the nature
and extent of the use, the nature of the work and
the market for the work, use by a for-profit business
without permission suggests that the use is not a fair
one.133 For example, unless the material is in the
public domain, use of clip art must be licensed.134
For academic institutions, fair use met its most sig-
nificant milestone recently with the decree that standard-
ized the rules for operating copy centers. In 1991, a
lawsuit against commercial photocopy center Kinko's in
New York established legal precedent that a copy center
would be held liable for copying copyrighted works on
behalf of students, at the request of college faculty.135
The coursepacks created by Kinko's at the behest of
NYU and Columbia faculty were held to be violations
of the publisher's copyrights, and Kinko's was violating
the copyrights by reprinting the coursepacks without
paying royalties. 36 That decision has been respected
by all other courts addressing the issue.137 Today,
most educational institutions have policies and prac-
tices that undertake to comply with the Kinko's
decision and the obligation to obtain copyright
clearance for materials that are printed and sold.
Nothing in the law or applications of the fair use
doctrine to the Internet suggest that any different result
will occur online. With increasing ease, faculty members
may now post significant amounts of copyrighted mate-
rial to class websites, eliminating the steps of physically
compiling a course pack complying with a photocopy
center's copyright clearance policy. This has the
added benefit of allowing students to download all
of the materials, and print only those portions each
student thinks most useful) 38 For materials available
elsewhere on the Internet, faculty members some-
times post only links to those other materials. 39
Because of the problems that occur when a site linked
to the instructor's website becomes unavailable, instruc-
tors often post the course materials on the class
website, regardless of whether the materials are oth-
erwise available at other Internet sites. This consti-
tutes copying the copyright holder's work and may
also constitute redistributing and displaying it to
the students in the class, or the general public. 40
Even works otherwise available on the Internet are
protected. 4' The fact that a work is free to the public
on a particular website does not mean that the work can
be re-posted to a second website without permission.
While fair use provides for some permissible unau-
thorized posting of copyrighted material, the doctrine
is becoming increasingly narrow. 42 Over the first
few years of the Internet's growth, charging for
content has been done only infrequently. As the
medium matures, however, this is likely to change.
As a result, instructors must be aware that the same
fair use principles that govern coursepacks should be
applied to virtual coursepacks as well. In both instances,
a series of industry guidelines have been developed
that assist institutions in understanding some of the
parameters governing fair use. The first is the Agree-
ment on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-
For-Profit Educational Institutions (the "Classroom
Guidelines"). 143 These guidelines were the result of
negotiation and agreement among the Ad Hoe Committee
of Educational Institutions and Organizations on Copy-
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right Law Revision, the Authors League of America,
Inc. and the Association of American Publishers.'44
The Classroom Guidelines provide for a minimum
rather than a maximum of allowed unauthorized copy-
ing. 45 Nonetheless, the minimum is somewhat of a
misnomer, because it is the minimum below which the
Authors League of America, Inc. and the Association of
American Publishers will not challenge the unauthorized
publication, rather than any express license or grant. As
the Kinko's court put it, "fair use standards may be more
or less permissive. ' 46 As a result, the Class Guidelines
can serve in only that capacity-as guides rather than
rules. On the practical, or normative level, however, the
adoption of the Class Guidelines will discourage com-
plaints and litigation by most copyright holders because
they provide a widely-recognized standard of conduct.
The Classroom Guidelines for copying and distrib-
uting textual materials are also limited to nonprofit
educational institutions.47 Increasingly, however, the
advances in technology have led for-profit entities such
as University of Phoenix and Argosy University to
provide for-profit education. 48 These guidelines are
inapplicable to for-profit uses, and the commercial
nature of the enterprise will invariably narrow the
scope of permissible fair use.49 Since copying is gener-
ally not transformative when an instructor reproduces
materials to distribute to students, 50 the factors sug-
gest that fair use in this context will be very limited.
In the for-profit educational setting, little or no reli-
ance should be made on fair use. In the nonprofit educa-
tional environment, the Classroom Guidelines provide
a solid framework for structuring a policy for in-
classroom use. Because the Classroom Guidelines
refer to the copying of text, they seem to work
equally well whether the materials are printed and
physically distributed or posted to a website that
can be visited only by the enrolled students.'
With the use of bulletin boards, listservs and chat-
rooms, both the instructor and the students have the
ability to copy and distribute copyrighted materials.
Students, educators and the public should remain mind-
ful that the placement of copyrighted works on the
Internet does not make that work part of the public
domain, or otherwise free to copy. These are all
policies of intellectual honesty. Thus, instructors
should take steps to protect the copyrighted works
of others from unnecessary copying or distribution
at the outset of the distance learning experience. 52
B. Classroom Performance Exemp-
tions and Their Application to Dis-
tance Learning
Although the fair use doctrine provides the broadest
general exception to the exclusive rights under copyright
law, a number of other sections of the statute provide
additional limitations as well.'53 For educators, the
most significant limitations to copyright beyond fair
use are embodied in section 110 of the Copyright Act.
For "face-to-face teaching activities" the statute gives
faculty members wide latitude to perform copyrighted
works as part of the class, including music, television
programs and films.'54 To meet these standards, the
performance must be (1) operated by the classroom
instructor, (2) in "a classroom or a similar place devoted
to instruction" and (3) in a live teaching environment
that is not mediated through distance technology. 55 As a
result, an instructor is allowed to perform or display any
work in class. This includes encouraging students to
perform scenes from a play, read text aloud, play music
or show motion pictures. The presentation must be in a
classroom rather than transmitted between rooms, and the
copy used for the performance or display must itself be a
lawful rather than pirated copy. 6 While this law provides
tremendous flexibility for the live classroom instructor to
bring the Internet into the classroom, it does not provide
any copyright protection for distance instruction.'57
Further, the exemption in section 110(1) has some
important limitations. First, it does not include reproduc-
tion or distribution rights. This means that display in
class using a high quality document projector would
be acceptable whereas the scanning of the image into
a PowerPoint presentation would include the act of
reproduction that is not permitted under this exception.'58
If the creation of the PowerPoint presentation required
changing the work by cropping, re-coloring, editing
or annotating, the creation of the slides would also
constitute the creation of a derivative work, which is
also beyond the scope of the in-class exemption and is
permitted only if allowed under the fair use exception.
Second, the exemption is limited to the classroom,
so any archive posted to a website of the class presenta-
tion, or any posting to a class website of the materials
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displayed in class would fall outside of the exemption. The Register of Copyrights, after consulta-
As such, the exemption provides great protection for tion with representatives of copyright owners,
in-class activities, and significantly less protection nonprofit educational institutions, and non-
from liability for use of new technologies. And, profit libraries and archives, shall submit to the
most significantly, it is inapplicable when those activi- Congress recommendations on how to promote
ties involve distance learning tools or applications, distance education through digital technolo-
For out-of-the-classroom activities, copyright law has gies, including interactive digital networks,
a much more narrow provision that may accommodate while maintaining an appropriate balance
some forms of distance education. Under section 110(2) between the rights of copyright owners and
of the Copyright Act, a nondramatic literary or musi- the needs of users of copyrighted works.
16 2
cal work may be transmitted or broadcast to another
classroom or directly to the student if the student's The Copyright office conducted an extensive com-
disabilities or other special circumstances require that ment and hearing process that resulted in a comprehen-
the student learn outside of the classroom.159 The law sive study on the need for amendment of the Copyright
was not drafted to include "special circumstances" Act. At the heart of the findings, the Register's report
such as work schedules or the myriad issues that concluded that "the Copyright Act should be amended
cause students to enroll in distance education, so in several respects in order to promote distance educa-
the provision is extremely limited in application. Fur- tion through digital technologies.'1 63 The essence of
ther, the language of the section does not include these recommendations is to expand the exemptions of
copying or distribution, so an educator would be section 110(1) to eliminate the classroom limitations by
hard pressed to comply with this provision when teach- "updating section 110(2), the exemption for instructional
ing using modem, distance learning techniques.161 broadcasting, to allow the same types of performances
Finally, it should be noted that the broadcast exemp- and displays it currently permits to be delivered by means
tion applies only to nondramatic, literary or musical of digital technologies, and received by students in remote
works. This excludes traditional entertainment products locations, whether or not in a physical classroom.' 164
such as movies, operas or musicals-works that tell Congress has begun the process of adopting the
a story. Text-based teaching materials are nondra- Register's recommendations. 65 Under a bill pending
matic. Songs, apart from the story of a musical, before Congress, the in-classroom limitations of section
are also non-dramatic. Educational materials, how- 110(1) would be extended to distance education. The
ever, may range widely and some will include dra- limitations would also closely mirror section 110(1).
matic works that cannot be broadcast without the The materials eligible are those intended for in-class
copyright holder's permission under this section. activities rather than those typically used "in 1 or more
The scope of section 110 has come under increas- class sessions of a single course, such works as textbooks,
ing attack because of its narrow reach and inap- course packs, or other material ... which are typically
plicability to distance education. In anticipation of purchased or acquired by the students ... .,166 The
the problems section 110 would create as distance material must be "directly related and of material assis-
education grows, in 1998 Congress ordered the tance to the teaching content of the transmission"'167
and lim-T H! Fposting of copyrighted material on a website is copyright infringement ited to the
I !.unless there is an exception to the exclusive rights of the copyright holder enrolled
pyrigstudentsThe fair use doctrine provides the greatest flexibility for the faculty member or s te(to the
institution operating a website and hoping to use the work of another extenttech-
nically fea-
Register of Copyrights to prepare a report on the sible). In addition, the institution must provide copyright
applicability of section 110 to distance education.' 61 notices on the material and provide "informational
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materials to faculty, students, and relevant staff mem-
bers that accurately describe, and promote compli-
ance with, the laws of the United States relating to
copyright ...."168 This latter provision again reinforces
the increasing importance of education and normative
practice regarding copyright policy and regulation.
This amendment to section 110(2) will not pre-
clude fair use for the multitude of situations that are
not anticipated under the proposed amendment. It
is also unclear whether the bill will ultimately be
enacted. In the interim, the bill and the Register's
recommendations support limited fair use of copy-
righted materials in the distance learning environment.
C. The Safe Harbor for Operating
Online Services: Copyright Infringe-
ment by Students and Others
In addition to potential liability for direct copyright
infringement by faculty members and academic institu-
tions, educational institutions also may face liability for
copyright infringement by its students and users. A
third party may become liable for copyright infringe-
ment caused by another party in two separate situa-
tions.' 69 A party may be responsible under the theory
of vicarious liability for the conduct of its agent or
servant, °70 or it may be responsible for materially
contributing to the infringement of another party.17 1
Although contributory and vicarious liability are
quite similar, each has specific legal requirements.
The typical relationship for vicarious liability is that
of employer-employee, in which the tort liability of
the employee transfers to the employer.72 Applied to
copyright, however the doctrine is not that limited.
"[E]ven in the absence of an employer-employee relation-
ship one may be vicariously liable if he has the right
and ability to supervise the infringing activity and
also has a direct financial interest in such activi-
ties."'7 These twin requirements of right and ability
to control and direct financial interest have been
increasingly easy to establish under copyright law.17 1
The Ninth Circuit's decision in A&M Records v.
Napster, Inc. modified the meaning of control by trans-
forming the traditional employment criteria into a broad
relationship based on Napster's ability to find infringing
material on its system and to terminate the accounts of its
users.75  Under this standard, virtually every aca-
demic institution receives revenue directly or indirectly
based on student participation and has the ability to
set policies for students and terminate access if stu-
dents violate those policies. As a result, the common
law vicarious liability standard creates the potential
for significant liability for academic institutions.
Similarly, academic institutions may be liable for
contributory liability in certain situations. To be liable,
it must be established that the college or university has
knowledge of the infringing conduct and materially
contributes to the conduct. 76 Knowledge has generally
been held to mean that the party "know or have reason to
know" of the direct infringement. 77 Material contribu-
tion may come from providing the online service used
for infringement. But in the context of distant edu-
cation, this standard should be more rigorous and
require that the contributory infringer provide some-
thing more specific than access. As in Napster, promot-
ing infringement or otherwise encouraging it should
remain sufficient to establish secondary liability.7 1
Because of the overwhelming potential for secondary
copyright infringement, Congress has provided statu-
tory protection that will serve to limit liability if the
requirements in the statute are followed.' 79 These provi-
sions all require that the infringing material be posted
by someone other than the Internet service provider
("ISP"). 18 ° Academic institutions often meet the defi-
nition of an ISP. The first two provisions of section
512 limit liability for material that is transferred
through the ISP's digital network or is archived as
a result of that transfer. This sort of distribution
and recordation will not result in copyright liability.8'
When the academic institution is an ISP because of
the facilities it supplies to its students and the academic
community, it has a limited safe harbor from copyright
infringement caused by its students or others.812 As
an ISP, the institution avoids liability for the copyright
violations of its students if it did not author or otherwise
directly control the content of the postings, if it has
a policy discouraging copyright violations and if it
promptly removes offending material from the website
in accordance with the statute.'83 The school must also
make available the name and contact information of the
party to receive notices of alleged copyright infringe-
ment.8 4 The school has an obligation to notify
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the party who posted the materials. If that party
objects to the removal, the school can re-post the
information after ten days, unless a court has
ordered another course of action.8 5 The ten days
provide the parties involved an opportunity to come
to court to request a temporary restraining order.
The limitations embedded in section 512 also reflect
common notions of secondary liability. If the educational
institution has knowledge of infringement, supplied
through the notice provisions, it must then undertake to
eliminate the offending material. Although the statute
does not state it explicitly, the institution may also wish to
reserve the right to close any account of a party who is the
subject of one or more notice and take-down procedures.'86
Congress also recognized that the relationship
between the academic institution and its faculty is not
always simpatico. To allow for those situations when
the academic institution needs to distance itself from the
copyright violations of its faculty members (including
graduate students), Congress has provided a very narrow
additional exemption from liability.18 7 If the copied
material is used for online course activities, the school
cannot absolve itself of its vicarious liability arising
from the conduct of its instructors, but if the material
is used for other purposes-such as scholarship-then
the relationship is less direct, and a safe harbor may be
available.'88 Additionally, as a prerequisite for immunity,
there can be no more than two notices of potential
copyright infringement in the proceeding three years,
and the institution must provide a copyright policy that
promotes compliance with copyright provisions. 9 If
any of these provisions are not met, the institution loses
the benefit of the safe harbor and its immunity will
be stripped away. As a result, institutions should be
highly motivated to monitor the activities of faculty
members and graduate students using online tools.
D. Licensed Structure and Format:
The Real Solution to Copyright Prob-
lems in the Distance Education Con-
text
Given the narrow applicability of the fair use doctrine
and section 110 to distance education, the primary
method of obtaining and using copyrighted material is
by licensing it. The importance of licensing content for
distance education cannot be understated. Licensing
content owned by other parties provides another effective
strategy for dealing with copyright issues. Many com-
mercial publishers make course materials, news
feeds, customized content and other changing, topical
information available for website publishers. This
transfers the obligation of content creation to a third
party, may substantially reduce the cost of creating
content and may result in dynamic, timely presentations.
As discussed above, it is important that copyright
and intellectual property interests be respected with
regard to use of the Internet. If an institution is rely-
ing upon third-party developers to put together its web-
site, before the website is designed the parties should
establish what materials and content will be incor-
porated into the site and who owns those materials.
The company purchasing the website design may
not be able to insist that it be the copyright holder of
the website for practical reasons. Many of the ele-
ments utilized on a complex webpage may be built from
software programs owned by the independent contractor
creating the site and used repeatedly by that vendor
on site after site. In those situations, a more specific
license agreement should be used, itemizing what
works are granted by a non-exclusive, perpetual
license to the institution and what materials are
assigned to the company. The academic institution
should be wary of short-term licenses because those
licenses will likely result in renegotiation of the
website contracts or redesign of the website itself.
The issue of website design is more critical if the site
includes information from multiple parties or obtained
through affiliated organizations. When a third-party
web-host is used, the contract should clearly provide who
owns the data that is generated (names, addresses, etc.)
and what usage rights the other party has to that data.
Another issue that may arise from the website design
concerns the allocation of duties and responsibilities,
including the obligations to select, edit and post the
content on the website, defend the parties from litiga-
tion, and indemnify the parties from losses resulting
from the website's operation. Webpage designers range
from graphic artists who happen to use the computer
to sophisticated software programmers who customize
each application to the needs of an individual client.
The specifications of the website, its operations, suite
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of customer services and general design should all be
specified in advance in the design agreement. Finally,
the agreement should provide for testing of the site
and, to the extent it is an interactive site, maintenance
and updating of the software embedded in the site.
V. Limitations Beyond Copyright
In addition to the potential problem of copyright liabil-
ity, there are a variety of similar potential problems
for academic institutions providing distance learning
environments. The Internet creates a platform for any
person or institution to become a commercial publisher
with the push of a button. For most educational institu-
tions, common law publication obligations remain in
full force on the Internet. The law of defamation and
of common law privacy remain significant restric-
tions on unbridled use of the Internet for publication.
A. Defamation Law and Privacy
Rights
The issues involving common law defamation and pri-
vacy rights are not unique to educators on the Internet.
The potentially volatile nature of instantaneous publica-
tion should make academic institutions aware that dan-
gers may exist. 190 Policies that require editorial control,
content review and regular policing should be adopted
and enforced so that the organization does not find itself
embarrassed or liable for the words published on its behalf.
A statement is defamatory if"it tends so to harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of
the community or to deter third persons from associat-
ing or dealing with him."'19 Under the common law, a
statement was considered defamatory if it held one out
for hatred, ridicule, or contempt.192 Any publication to
a third person, such as through publication on a website
or through sending an e-mail, will give rise to liability.
Even if the statement is not made directly by or on behalf
of the organization, the organization may be liable if it
republishes the statement by posting another's material
to the website, or if it fails to take reasonable steps once
it is made aware that defamatory material has been posted
on its online facilities. 93 As a result, a school is responsi-
ble for defamatory material in work it creates, licenses or
republishes. 94 It will also be liable for defamatory works
posted to its site by third parties if it fails to remove the
defamatory material once it is on notice of the content.'95
In distance education, any content published by the
school or its employees can result in liability for the
school if the material is found to be defamatory. If the
allegedly defamed party is a public official or public
figure, that party must prove that the statement was
knowingly false or made with reckless disregard
to the truth.196  If the party is neither a public
figure nor a public official, the school will be liable
if the person can establish that the material was
posted negligently. 97  The republication of libels
found elsewhere is subject to the same standards.
As part of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
Congress exempted ISPs from state or federal liability
for defamation that was created by other parties. 98 The
law (which remains in effect despite other portions of
the Act having been declared unconstitutional) provides
the following: "No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another informa-
tion content provider."'199 An "interactive computer
service [is] any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer service, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to
the Internet. .". .",00 An "information content provider
[is] any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development of informa-
tion provided through the Internet or any other interac-
tive computer service. 20' Under the policy created by
Congress, a school or institution that provides e-mail and
Internet accounts for its students should be treated as an
interactive computer service protected by the statute. As
a result, the institution will not be automatically liable for
postings by students or other parties that are defamatory.
The statute, however, does not eliminate liability
for postings made by or on behalf of the school.
Such postings will certainly include those by
faculty or other employees of the institution acting
in their professional capacities. This also could
extend to include postings by students acting at the
behest and under the control of a faculty member.
Further, the law specifically states that the interactive
service company will not be considered a publisher or
speaker for purposes of the law. That leaves intact the
common law rules regarding republishers of defamatory
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information. Under the common law, a bookstore or
other reseller of defamatory information could be held
liable if that person was informed of the defamatory
information and failed to take reasonable steps to remove
the offending materials. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit,
as the first appellate court to review the application of the
provision, has extended section 230 to limit liability and
immunize ISPs from republisher liability as well. 2 Since
then, a number of additional courts have expanded the
reach of section 230 to remove all liability.2 °3 Nonethe-
less, the language of the statute leaves open the pos-
sibility of third-party liability. This is particularly
true if the third party has an affirmative obligation
regarding the postings because the libelous statements
were among enrolled students and the supervising fac-
ulty member or the institution failed to respond to
the request that the offensive material be removed.
In addition to traditional defamation, the common
law doctrine of false light creates liability for invasion
of privacy by giving a person "unreasonable and highly
objectionable publicity that attributes to him character-
istics, conduct or beliefs that are false, and so is placed
before the public in a false position."204 Even if the
statement is laudatory, it may be actionable if it is highly
objectionable and false.0 5 False light has evolved into a
close approximation of defamation for those statements
that are injurious but not so contemptuous as to be
defamatory. As such, privacy invasions are inten-
tional torts requiring intent or reckless disregard of the
truth, rather than the negligence standard available for
libelous statements made regarding private persons. 2 6
In addition to false light, other privacy invasions may
be actionable. Unwanted, highly offensive, broadly
disseminated publication of one's personal information
remains a common law tort susceptible to Internet abuse.207
Broad publication of a person's physical or mental health
issues may result in liability as would any number of other
statements that are true but highly embarrassing when
broadcast to the public and of little public concern.2 08
Another aspect of privacy is the publicity rights of
those whose name, likeness or other identifying informa-
tion is used on a website.0 9 States like New York and Cali-
fornia, in addition to many others, afford broad protection
to these rights. The California statute is representative.
Any person who knowingly uses another's
name, voice, signature, photograph, or like-
ness, in any manner, on or in products, mer-
chandise, or goods, or for purposes of adver-
tising or selling, or soliciting purchases of,
products, merchandise, goods or services,
without such person's prior consent... shall
be liable for any damages sustained by the
person or persons injured as a result thereof.210
Courts have recognized that use of a website to pro-
mote the goods or services of an organization may be
deemed a commercial use.211 Further, most states do
not require that the photographs be of famous people.212
Showing recognizable individuals from events or panel
discussions creates the impression of association with an
institution's activities or services and requires the permis-
sion of each person who is identifiable in the photographs.
When using photographs on websites or streaming
video and audio presentations, publicity rights can
become a serious concern for colleges and universities.
The use of this content in a restricted course website
should properly be treated as non-commercial, and
therefore outside the framework of publicity-rights. The
same, however, is not true for names, photographs, audio
recordings and other aspects of one's identity when they
are used on public websites designed to promote the
school or traffic to the site in general. In this setting, the
use of a person's identity is a form of commercial activity
(advertising or promotional in nature) and the permis-
sion of the person is generally required prior to use.
B. Linking and Framing: Online
Trademark Issues ... and a Bit More
Another common use of a website is to link that
site to others on the Internet by adding a hyperlink
address to a webpage owned and operated by another
party.2 13 Although a common practice, linking raises
some legal issues that educators should recognize.
Until very recently, there seemed no significant con-
cern that linking violates the copyright of the sit&being
linked. The address itself is a fact that cannot be pro-
tected by copyright.214 In addition, at least one court has
even suggested linking as a way for a defendant in an
infringement action to avoid liability.215 Despite this, in
at least one situation, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,216 the
Ninth Circuit has now held that "inline links" can give
GAR ON
rise to a violation of the display right of a third party
website.2 7 In Kelly, the court found that linking a search
engine to full-quality graphic images on third-parties'
websites was a violation of the display rights in those
third parties' websites.218 Although the court correctly
asserted that one can display a copy of a work when
showing the "material object 'in which the work is first
fixed,' ",219 this merely means that a television camera
pointed at an original oil painting would be a display of
the material object in which the work was first fixed.
The court asserted that since the original work may be
displayed, a link to that work is also a display.220 This
assertion ignores the fact that it is the viewer who calls
up the images directly from Kelly's server to his or
her own computer for viewing. Arriba's search engine
provides the link to the graphic image involved, but
it does not copy the file, retransmit it or play any inter-
mediary role in the viewer calling up the image, other
than providing the IP address.
If this case sets the new TH 1rframes cc
standard for display rights, -Limpressio
then many presently accept-
able practices may be vio- user is receiving cor
lations of display rights, one website, whet
Fortunately, the court did actually providing t
find that the remainder of
the search engine fell within
the fair use exception, so the implications may be
a bit more modest than one might otherwise fear.
As a result of this turn of events, a faculty member
pointing out information to students on other websites
should be particularly conscious to have the students
open those sites directly rather than as frames
within the faculty member's course pages. Students
may sometimes be required to enroll in the course
as a condition of reading the content, and they
should be instructed on this obligation in advance.
The situation where the Ninth Circuit's approach
could have the greatest impact is in deep linking. This
occurs when the link offered by the faculty member
bypasses layers of information that the author of the
linked site had intended the viewers to see. This process,
sometimes referred to as "deep linking," may result in
directing students past pages with a company's advertis-
ing. Although not a significant legal risk, it is conceiv-
able that deep linking may give rise to liability on
contract or trademark grounds, or as an extension of the
Kelly decision. If the website's usage policy prohibits
any linking to the page for commercial use, then this
contract may be enforceable.2 21 Enforcement is more
likely if the prohibition is embodied in an agreement that
requires the user to affirmatively acknowledge it, rather
than if the provision is buried in a hard-to-find page of
terms and conditions.222 The use of inline linking as
described in Kelly may also trigger usage issues when the
links avoid some of the copyright owner's other content.
A remaining concern with linking is the extent to
which the design of a webpage may create the false
impression that the content is created by the linking site.
Trademark infringement may arise from deep linking,
if the referencing page and the selected deep link are
such that users will likely be confused as to the source of
the linked pages. In addition, linking may, in some situ-
ations, suggest that the linking site endorses the content
at the linked site or suggest
n create the mistaken false authorship or affilia-
tion of the author. Also, if
n that the computer the linked pages are violat-
tent or services from ing copyright law or the pri-
another source is vacy or publicity rights of a
he data. third party, the linking site
should be under an obligation
to remove the links to that
site once it is aware of the infringing or tortious conduct.
In addition to linking, framing may give rise to liability.
Framing enables a Web page designer to split a
page into independent scrollable regions,
each capable of displaying a separate and
distinct external Web page. Rather than
having to leave the screen of one Web page
to access another, the framing feature allows
a user to 'display' a portion of a separate
Web site on the one originally accessed.223
This practice creates far more potential liability than the
acts of linking one site to another. In fact, it may have
been framing that the court in Kelly was trying to address
when it described "inline linking and framing."24
The frames can create the mistaken impression that
the computer user is receiving content or services from
one website, when another source is actually providing
)r
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the data. For example, Total News created frames
which it used to provide news stories of interest
to its readers. The news content, however, came
from publishers such as The Washington Post. Total
News never copied the stories, but by framing the
news with its own advertising, it used the content
of other publishers to help it sell advertising.2 25
Because it does not involve direct copying, many
commentators do not believe framing is a copyright
violation. Nonetheless, framing may be construed as
creating a derivative work, or creating a likelihood of
confusion when it adds to or hides the trademarks of the
content provider. In addition, as discussed by the Ninth
Circuit, a broad reading of display rights could mean that
thejoint image is a display of the source work by the fram-
ing website, violating the exclusive rights to display.2 26
Wherever possible, cooperative licensing agreements
should be utilized to eliminate any issues regarding
the scope of permissible conduct. Such agreements
should protect the trademarks of both parties to the
agreement, outline the acceptable uses to which each
party can put its website and provide for mutual polic-
ing of the Internet for potential misconduct. The
license agreement may also serve as evidence regard-
ing the value of a webpage's content and enforce-
ability of the publisher's rights in future litigation.
Other techniques are also available to promote website
transactions that may create potential legal issues. For
example, metatags are words embedded in a website
that allow Internet search engines to locate a site. Some
search engines prioritize a site by the number of times
the term appears in that site.227 The use of metatags is a
common practice. The legal question that arises in
this context is whether the use of trademarks from
competitors or other third parties constitutes an infringe-
ment of those trademarks. The use of a competitor's
metatag allows a competitor to appear on a search engine
list when a consumer types another company's name.
For example, by embedding "Barbie" in an adult
website, that site appeared on searches for Mattel's doll.2 28
The potential for infringement may exist if the extensive
use of the competitor's trademark and the design of
the website will lead to a likelihood of consumer
confusion. Assuming no trademark infringement
arises from the domain name itself, or other
conduct, limited use of trademarks in the metatags
should not be sufficient to create a likelihood of
confusion or dilution of a famous trademark.2 29
The issue of linking metatags to the advertising of
third parties has also been tested in court. Playboy
sued the Internet portal Excite.com for selling banner
advertisements that were triggered by a consumer's
use of the trademarked Playboy@ or Playmate@ as a
search term.230 The court dismissed the trademark
claim, because to recognize the claim would effectively
hamper use of the English language, because an ever
expanding list of words and phrases would be deemed
proprietary information protected by law. The claim that
the banner advertisements created initial interest confu-
sion was also found wanting, because the advertisements
themselves did not create any confusion. Nonetheless,
Est6e Lauder brought a similar suit against Excite.2 31
Because Estee Lauder is a proper name, and the issue
may also include the use of a name for commercial
purposes, the analysis may be somewhat different.2 32
C. Policing a School's Trademarks
and Domain Names on the Internet
Academic institutions should be careful to protect both
the trademark of the organization and the domain name
of its website 33 Companies must regularly audit the
name to insure that others are not using it, or a close
facsimile, as a domain name.3 An example of the
difficulties faced in policing trade names is shown by
the 2000 presidential race. Political organizations for
both the Bush and Gore presidential campaigns were
closely mirrored by parody sites. 235 www.gwbush.com
mocked the official www.georgebush.com site, while
www.algore.org did the same to Gore's official site at
www.gore2000.org. 36 The parody websites may become
an embarrassment, while more cleverly targeted sites
could misleadpotential students and donors. To the extent
that these websites are trading on the confusion caused
by using the organization's name, the organization should
aggressively seek court protection of its trademarks
to prohibit such confusion and commercialization. 7
Confusing use of a company's trademark by a third
party in a domain name is now actionable under fed-
eral law. Under the anti-cyberpiracy provisions of
the Lanham Trademark Act,238 a party who registers a
domain name using the trademark of another party with
the intent to resell the mark or use the mark in a manner
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that would create public confusion will be held liable.3 9
In addition to policing the various top-level domains
for uses of the company's trademark, a company must
also police for similar uses of the mark. The practice of
"typosquatting" is the practice of using domain names
that include the common typographical errors to
popular trademarks. For example, Foxmews.com
is a site dedicated to promoting civil disobedience
and anti-corporate activities. 240 This practice, how-
ever, can be turned to a corporation's advantage.
For example, Britannica Encyclopedia is available
from both Britannica.com and Britanica.com. 2
41
Significant changes have also taken place that make
the management of domain names more difficult. In
November 2000, ICANN began the development of new,
top-level domain names to complement the existing top-
level domains, .com, .org., .gov., .edu. and .mil.242 After
much rancor and frustration, ICANN selected seven
additional top-level domains which will be managed by
contracts with additional registrars.243 The new domains
are for the aerospace industry, ".aero," businesses, ".biz,"
cooperatives, ".coop," information, ".info," museums,
.museum," individuals, ".name," and "accountants,
lawyers, physicians, and other professionals, ".pro. '244
Although there has been little interest in these names-
particularly with the slowdown in the number of Inter-
net start-ups-good corporate planning demands that
companies seek to capture the use of their trademarks in
each of the available domains. The net effect has been
very little traffic, but some increased revenue for regis-
trars hosting multiple domains for the same companies.
Another aspect of domain name disruption has more
practical significance for educational companies. The
educational top-level domain, .edu, is a restricted domain
which requires validation in order to use the domain. The
U.S. Department of Commerce moved the management
of .edu to the nonprofit organization Educause as part of a
significant change in the management of .edu policies.245
As part of the transition, all existing .edu schools
and colleges are being allowed to keep their existing
domain names. 246 For newcomers, to be eligible for the
.edu top-level domain, the institution must be a "degree-
granting institution of higher education accredited by
one of the six U.S. regional accrediting bodies. Duly
accredited community colleges and other two-year-
degree institutions are thus eligible for the first time. 247
For community colleges, this is a significant change.
It is too early to tell whether it will have other effects.
D. Special Concerns for E-Mail
Communications
E-mail allows a person to send a message to one or
more recipients. It can also be used to attach other
documents or software files. Once sent, an e-mail
will travel an unpredictable path to its destination.
Although e-mail is a basic tool of the Internet,
a number of legal issues may arise from its use.
Because e-mail is used for communications between
members of a business organization both internally
and with the public, a number of legal issues must be
addressed through a comprehensive employment policy.
Most of these issues involve varying privacy rules.
Because the rules of privacy vary with use, this
remains an area of law that is subject to ongoing
change. "Unlike postal mail, simple e-mail generally
is not 'sealed' or secure, and can be accessed or
viewed on intermediate computers between the sender
and recipient (unless the message is encrypted). ' '248
The problems of security should always be considered
when using e-mail. Changes in the importance and
acceptance of e-mail, however, have changed the
norms of privacy and security even though physical
security remains low. E-mail is often used in a vari-
ety of situations that may involve private or even
privileged content, such as student information cov-
ered by FERPA,249 labor issues involving faculty or
communications involving attorney-client discussions.
Because e-mail is not secure, questions linger regard-
ing its use for privileged communications. The fear of
unsecured transmission has given way, however, to the
ubiquity of e-mail and a greater expectation of pri-
vacy by users. Where legal privacy is sufficient,
e-mail has become increasingly useful; where the
unauthorized access to data could lead to theft of
financial information or create national security risks,
legal respect for the privacy of e-mail is insufficient.
Courts have applied the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA') to criminalize the intentional
interception of e-mail transmissions.2 0 Despite the abil-
ity to use e-mail for confidential communications, cau-
tion must still be used. Accidental transmission to third
parties will waive any privilege to the communication.
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In 1986, Congress amended the original Federal example, Chevron Corp. was forced to pay four female
Wiretap Act with the ECPA to cover wired and wireless employees over $2.2 million as a settlement for sexual
electronic communications. Although, as an example of harassment, including an image of one employee
the law's limited focus, Congress excluded wire-
less telephones because they were so easily inter- TH use of metatags is a common practice.
cepted.2  In 1994, Congress plugged this hole I_.The legal question that arises in this
and demonstrated that anti-interception laws were
designed to stop interception of private communica- context is whether the use of trademarks from
tions, regardless of the ease of interception.2 5 2  competitors or other third parties constitutes an
Courts are no longer having difficulty finding infringement of those trademarks.
criminal and civil liability for interceptions of -
e-mail.25 3 The interception of e-mail must come doctored to. look obscene and offensive which was
during transmission, however, rather than through the circulated over the company's network.2 8 Even if
unauthorized reading of e-mail off another's computer the defense of the lawsuit is successful, the costs
screen or unauthorized access to the computer files.254  may be formidable.2 9 The same policy that allows
Given the statutory protection from the interception an employer to monitor e-mail, however, may also
of e-mail, courts are validating the public's growing increase its obligation to monitor and intervene.
expectation of privacy in e-mail transmissions. 5 Despite To the extent that the course website is the educational
this, however, numerous exceptions exist to the ECPA. environment, instructors and the institution have an
The first is a legal interpretation that retrieving a mes- ongoing obligation to make that environment appropriate
sage from storage does not constitute interception, and for learning. Schools that have no decorum policies
therefore does not trigger the statute. 6 Second, a com- or fail to investigate allegations regarding improper
munication may be intercepted if done with the consent postings of material on a classroom website may find
of a party.25 7 This permission may be granted as part of themselves legally responsible for the harassment of
the contractual conditions of employment of an employee one student by another. Typically, schools have detailed
or enrollment of a student. As a result, there should anti-harassment policies. These policies will likely
not be any reasonable reliance on the privacy of e-mail apply to the distance learning environment created by
transmissions by corporate employees, except to the the instructor, thus steps should be taken to assure that
extent created or eliminated by the employment policy, the distance learning website, course policies and other
Educational institutions may have significantly differ- material are placed within the framework of the anti-
ent policies governing e-mail monitoring of students harassment and other academic policies of the school.
and employees, and the institutions have an obligation In addition to the content and its use, the storage of
to insure that the stated policies are followed. State- e-mail on servers and back-up tapes may have additional
owned schools are additionally obligated under the First implications. Any message sent by a company, no matter
Amendment to allow students the right to communicate how off-the-cuff, becomes a permanent document that
without regard to the content of their communications. may be shared with far more people than the intended
One of the primary reasons that academic institutions recipient. Under most institutional data policies, e-mail
need policies to monitor e-mail is the potential liability becomes permanently stored in back-up recordings.
that can occur from misuse. E-mail can be used to Those e-mail records are subject to discovery and avail-
disseminate trade secrets and proprietary information able for use against the organization in the event of
very easily. Copyrighted computer files of documents, litigation. Because e-mail communications (and all
movies, music and software can be attached to e-mail computer back-up files) are corporate records subject to
for rapid duplication. E-mail can also be used to share discovery, an institution should incorporate all e-mail
jokes and personal information. This interaction, which backup files in its strategic document storage plan.
leaves a permanent record in the corporation's data files, Further, a business pattern of regularly deleting e-mails
may empower employees who are acting improperly. For may not eliminate totally the legacy of the e-mails or
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their contents, if the residual information remains stored
on the computer hard drives or back-up systems. 60
The final word on e-mail invariably turns on the
issue of spain-the mass-distribution of e-mail sent
to thousands or millions of e-mail addresses. This
technique is strongly disfavored on the Internet by
most users, but select 'calls-to-action' used by nonprofit
organizations are sometimes received favorably. Cur-
rently there is no federal legislation banning spain,
despite numerous attempts. 261 Proposed legislation
is again being considered by the House of Repre-
sentatives, but even that legislation reduces, rather
than eliminates, the practice.262 Industry leaders have
promised to set voluntary industry guidelines to curb
the worst practices, but to date no voluntary efforts
have had any substantial effect on the practice.263
Spam is a significant problem for large universities,
because of the amount of e-mail traffic it generates.
Private schools have the ability to create usage policies
that limit the types of communications for which
e-mail can be used. These policies filter out a sig-
nificant portion of spam e-mail. State institutions,
however, unlike private schools, have to be solicitous
of their students' rights to receive e-mail, making most
policies banning even spam very difficult to create.
E. Additional Burdens Imposed by
Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism: The
USA Patriot Act
In addition to the privacy and security safeguards already
in place in academic settings, the September 11, 2001 ter-
rorist attacks in New York and Washington have resulted
in sweeping additional legislation geared to strengthen
law enforcement's hand in collecting information to
combat terrorism. The first comprehensive piece of
legislation passed in the wake of the terrorist attacks was
the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. 1264
The USA Patriot Act is a sweeping law empower-
ing law enforcement to extend jurisdiction, increase
surveillance and expand the definition of terrorism.
265
The law has both specific and general provisions that
may effect academic institutions and distance learn-
ing environments. 66 The USA Patriot Act specifically
targets academic institutions by amending the federal
privacy rights held by students to allow an Assistant
Attorney General to seek a subpoena or ex parte order
to "collect education records in the possession of the
educational agency or institution that are relevant to an
authorized investigation or prosecution ....267 Once
issued, the academic institution has no choice but
to comply with the order. The provision also immu-
nizes the institution for compliance with such an
order, so long as the academic institution is acting
in good faith when carrying out its compliance.26 8
Most of the provisions of the USA Patriot Act incor-
porate academic institutions only because they generate
many of the communications to which law enforcement
is seeking greater access. 269 Some of these changes,
although loosely tied to terrorism, seem to simply mod-
ernize the federal police powers in light of the increased
importance of telecommunications and digital com-
munications in the economy and society. For example,
section 202 of the USA Patriot Act adds "computer
fraud and abuse" to the list of criminal activities for
which federal agents may be able to obtain authority
to conduct a wiretap.27 °  Similarly, the law now
treats telephone answering messages as documents
that can be seized with a warrant, rather than
communications for which the more stringent
wiretap authority is required. Under the new amend-
ment, telephone messages are treated in the same
manner as faxes, e-mail, and other documents. 72
More troubling to educational institutions are provi-
sions such as section 210, which authorized subpoenas
for a much broader range of records, including names,
connection records, IP addresses and methods of pay-
ment.273 This gives federal law enforcement much greater
ability to track the actual use of phone and Internet sys-
tems and may readily involve tracking the use of student
activities on university systems, if there is sufficient
evidence to establish the grounds for a subpoena.274
Equally problematic for colleges is the greater discre-
tion offered under the law for voluntary disclosure of
electronic records.2 75 The USA Patriot Act has added addi-
tional opportunities for institutions to provide information,
particularly to law enforcement. Under the Act, an ISP
may now voluntarily disclose the content of information:
(5) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of
the service or to the protection of the rights or property
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of the provider of that service; or
(6) to a law enforcement agency-
(A) if the contents-
(i) were inadvertently obtained by the service pro-
vider; and
(ii) appear to pertain to the commission of a
crime;
(B) if required by section 227 of the Crime Control
Act of 1990; or
(C) if the provider reasonably believes that an emer-
gency involving immediate danger of death or seri-
ous physical injury to any person requires disclosure
of the information without delay.276
The impact of this provision is to greatly expand an
ISP's discretion to aid law enforcement. The ability
to act in the face of potentially serious physical injury
seems self-evident. Of course an institution would
respond to a bomb on campus. But the statute requires
that the response be based on a reasonable belief and the
danger be of death or serious physical injury requiring
response without delay. Three different determinations
or "judgment calls" are required to make the decision to
volunteer information. The determination concerning
whether divulging information is necessary for "the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service" is unqualified.277 Thus, an academic institution
could theoretically undertake any investigation if a staff
member thought that it needed to protect its rights or
property. Yet, such an assertion would presumably
be based on some objectively reasonable standards.278
In addition, this provision, by its terms, does not
automatically abrogate an institution's duties under
FERPA. As a result, academic staff members are left
with inconsistent federal mandates to both protect student
privacy and to affirmatively participate in investigatory
processes.279 This inconsistency will tax academic
policymakers and lead to inconsistent internal operations
at some institutions. According to the Chronicle of
Education, "Cornell [University] established [] guide-
lines because college employees are sometimes
too eager to please law-enforcement agents by
quickly providing them with the information they
seek, or the employees are confused about which
college higher-ups to contact for advice ... -210
Despite these problems, educators-particularly those
which allow for "student" run classes or allow classes
to participate on aggregator websites without content
review-may need to take the potential for criminal or
terrorist misuse seriously. A fiction writing course could
easily be created and maintained as a front for operating
criminal or terrorist activities, with the ready excuse that
the postings were merely exercises for class role-playing
projects. The tools of distance education-e-mail, bul-
letin boards, teleconferencing, document sharing and
others-are extremely valuable tools for conducting any
enterprise. Burying an obscure course among a wide
range of offerings might provide the ideal combina-
tion of credibility and effectiveness to draw misuse
to otherwise well-intentioned educational systems.
The Cornell approach will invariably prove to be the
correct first step. Each institution will need to assess
its own system and policies, and based on those make a
determination regarding the types of incidents that will
trigger voluntary disclosure. At a minimum, schools
should receive authorization for monitoring all courses
to assure academic rigor and quality of instruction.
If these reviews trigger additional questions, the pol-
icies should provide guidance on what to do next.
The Cornell approach of identifying the individu-
als empowered to make the determination and setting
parameters for decision-making will both build confi-
dence in the institution's privacy policy and serve to
establish that a reasonable approach was followed if a
disclosure is ever challenged in court. These policies
should be developed collaboratively among institutions,
but each may have unique priorities that suggests that a
national model will take a great deal of time to develop.
Finally, in addition to the various law enforcement
powers, the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of
2001, enacted at section 1016 of the USA Patriot Act,
authorizes an expenditure in 2002 of $20,000,000 for
infrastructure study and analysis through the creation
of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center.21 The infrastructure identified includes both
physical and virtual components, so some of the key
Internet assets located on college campuses throughout
the country will be included in this study and support.
The newly formed center will require that the academic
institutions that have been most active in the development
of the Internet and other telecommunications systems
submit their historical and operational data.82 The
large expenditure, however, may prove a windfall
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to academic institutions, to the extent they can
provide the necessary research in mapping and
improving the virtual infrastructure of data, shaping
a more secure, second-generation academic web.
VI. Conclusion
The tension between academic institutions as creators
and consumers of intellectual property seems to be
most directly felt in the new areas of distance educa-
tion. Despite the significant opportunities to use new
media to expand the reach of the classroom to an ever-
growing body of students, concerns regarding copyright,
trademark and defamation law continue to limit and
dictate what schools attempt to do. These limitations are
more directly felt by individual instructors, who must
enforce appropriate usage policies for their students,
create copyrighted materials and negotiate with their
schools over the ownership of the valuable content created.
This Article has merely provided the starting point
for the development of a comprehensive policy approach
that every school should have to determine what choices
and balance are most appropriate for its development
of its intellectual property resources and its educational
mission. Copyright and trademark management, owner-
ship guidelines, usage policies and protocols on how
and when an instructor should intervene by removing a
posting or other material submitted by students are all
topics that need careful development by every school.
Using the legal and business guidelines in copyright
and other laws, each school can begin to tailor a usage
and implementation policy that meets the educational
and pedagogical goals of the classroom and insti-
tution. Because the goals of academic instruction
vary from school to school and from class to
class, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Instead,
the law provides a framework against which
an academically sound policy can be developed.
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To respect the Copyright Act and balance the needs of educators and publishers, the United States Copyright Office
has reprinted the following statements regarding the reproduction of copyrighted works at nonprofit educational institutions.
For further information, please see Copyright Circular 21: Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and
Librarians as well as the Copyright Act (both are available at http://www.loc.gov). The following guidelines are not part of
the Copyright Act, but represent statements regarding the meaning of the Act as reprinted in Circular 21 from the United
States Copyright Office.
Guidelines
Reproducing Copyrighted Printed Works for Classroom Use (from Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions
and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision, and of the Authors League of America, Inc., and the Association of American
Publishers, Inc.: Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect
to Books and Periodicals.)
I. Single Copying for Teachers
A single copy may be made of any of the following by or for a teacher at his or her individual request, for his or her
scholarly research, or use in teaching or preparation to teach a class:
A. A chapter from a book;
B. An article from a periodical or newspaper;
C. A short story, short essay or short poem, whether or not from a collective work;
D. A chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture from a book, periodical, or newspaper.
II. Multiple Copies for Classroom Use
Multiple copies (not to exceed in any event more than one copy per pupil in a course) may be made by or for the
teacher giving the course for classroom use or discussion; provided that:
A. The copying meets the tests of brevity and spontaneity as defined below; and
B. Meets the cumulative effect test as defined below; and
C. Each copy includes a notice of copyright.
Definitions
Brevity:
(i) Poetry: (a) A complete poem if less than 250 words and if printed on not more than two pages or, (b) from a longer
poem, an excerpt of not more than 250 words.
(ii) Prose: (a) Either a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500 words, or (b) an excerpt from any prose work
of not more than 1,000 words or 10 percent of the work, whichever is less, but in any event a minimum of 500 words.
[Each of the numerical limits stated in "i" and "ii" above may be expanded to permit the completion of an unfinished
line of a poem or of an unfinished prose paragraph.]
(iii) Illustration: One chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture per book or per periodical issue.
(iv) "Special" works: Certain works in poetry, prose or in "poetic prose" which often combine language with
illustrations and which are intended sometimes for children and at other times for a more general audience fall short
of 2,500 words in their entirety. Paragraph "ii" above notwithstanding such "special works" may not be reproduced
in their entirety; however, an excerpt comprising not more than two of the published pages of such special work and
containing not more than 10 percent of the words found in the text thereof, may be reproduced.
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Spontaneity:
(i) The copying is at the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher, and
(ii) The inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment of its use for maximum teaching effectiveness are so
close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for permission.
Cumulative Effect:
(i) The copying of the material is for only one course in the school in which the copies are made.
(ii) Not more than one short poem, article, story, essay or two excerpts may be copied from the same author, nor more
than three from the same collective work or periodical volume during one class term.
(iii) There shall not be more than nine instances of such multiple copying for one course during one class term.
[The limitations stated in "ii" and "iii" above shall not apply to current news periodicals and newspapers and current
news sections of other periodicals.]
III. Prohibitions as to I and II Above
Notwithstanding any of the above, the following shall be prohibited:
(A) Copying shall not be used to create or to replace or substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective
works. Such replacement or substitution may occur whether copies of various works or excerpts therefrom are
accumulated or reproduced and used separately.
(B) There shall be no copying of or from works intended to be "consumable" in the course of study or of teaching.
These include workbooks, exercises, standardized tests and test booklets and answer sheets and like consumable
material.
(C) Copying shall not:
(1) substitute for the purchase of books, publishers' reprints or periodicals;
(2) be directed by higher authority;
(3) be repeated with respect to the same item by the same teacher from term to term.
(D) No charge shall be made to the student beyond the actual cost of the photocopying.
Educational Uses Of Music
(From the Music Publishers' Association of the United States, Inc., the National Music Publishers' Association, Inc.,
the Music Teachers National Association, the Music Educators National Conference, the National Association of Schools of
Music, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law Revision.)
A. Permissible Uses
1. Emergency copying to replace purchased copies which for any reason are not available for an imminent
performance provided purchased replacement copies shall be substituted in due course.
2. For academic purposes other than performance, single or multiple copies of excerpts of works may be made, pro-
vided that the excerpts do not comprise a part of the whole which would constitute a performable unit such as a sec-
tion, movement or aria, but in no case more than 10 percent of the whole work. The number of copies shall not
exceed one copy per pupil.
3. Printed copies which have been purchased may be edited or simplified provided that the fundamental character of
the work is not distorted or the lyrics, if any, altered or lyrics added if none exist.
4. A single copy of recordings of performances by students may be made for evaluation or rehearsal purposes and
may be retained by the educational institution or individual teacher.
5. A single copy of a sound recording (such as a tape, disc or cassette) of copyrighted music may be made from
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sound recordings owned by an educational institution or an individual teacher for the purpose of constructing aural
exercises or examinations and may be retained by the educational institution or individual teacher. (This pertains
only to the copyright of the music itself and not to any copyright which may exist in the sound recording.)
B. Prohibitions
1. Copying to create or replace or substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works.
2. Copying of or from works intended to be "consumable" in the course of study or of teaching such as workbooks,
exercises, standardized tests and answer sheets and like material.
3. Copying for the purpose of performance, except as in A(l) above.
4. Copying for the purpose of substituting for the purchase of music, except as in A(1) and A(2) above.
5. Copying without inclusion of the copyright notice which appears on the printed copy.
Off-Air Recording of Broadcast Programming for Educational Purposes
(From Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, House Report on Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments.)
The purpose of establishing these guidelines is to provide standards for both owners and users of copyrighted
television programs.
(1) The guidelines were developed to apply only to off-air recording by nonprofit educational institutions.
(2) A broadcast program may be recorded off-air simultaneously with broadcast transmission (including simultane-
ous cable transmission) and retained by a nonprofit educational institution for a period not to exceed the first forty-five (45)
consecutive calendar days after date of recording. Upon conclusion of such retention period, all off-air recordings must
be erased or destroyed immediately. "Broadcast programs" are television programs transmitted by television stations for
reception by the general public without charge.
(3) Off-air recordings may be used once by individual teachers in the course of relevant teaching activities, and
repeated once only when instructional reinforcement is necessary, in classrooms and similar places devoted to instruction
within a single building, cluster, or campus, as well as in the homes of students receiving formalized home instruction, during
the first ten (10) consecutive school days in the forty-five (45) day calendar day retention period. "School days" are school
session days-not counting weekends, holidays, vacations, examination periods, or other scheduled interruptions-within the
forty-five (45) calendar day retention period.
(4) Off-air recordings may be made only at the request of, and used by, individual teachers, and may not be regularly
recorded in anticipation of requests. No broadcast program may be recorded off-air more than once at the request of the same
teacher, regardless of the number of times the program may be broadcast.
(5) A limited number of copies may be reproduced from each off-air recording to meet the legitimate needs of
teachers under these guidelines. Each such additional copy shall be subject to all provisions governing the original recording.
(6) After the first ten (10) consecutive school days, off-air recording may be used up to the end of the forty-five (45)
calendar day retention period only for teacher evaluation purposes, i.e., to determine whether or not to include the broadcast
program in the teaching curriculum, and may not be used in the recording institution for student exhibition or any other
non-evaluation purpose without authorization.
(7) Off-air recordings need not be used in their entirety, but the recorded programs may not be altered from their
original content. Off-air recordings may not be physically or electronically combined or merged to constitute teaching
anthologies or compilations.
(8) All copies of off-air recordings must include the copyright notice on the broadcast program as recorded.
(9) Educational institutions are expected to establish appropriate control procedures to maintain the integrity of
these guidelines.
In general, the purpose of the guidelines listed above is to state the minimum and not the maximum standards of
educational fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act.
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Examinations, Grading and Written Submissions:
Each student will receive a cumulative grade for the course. Course grades will be based on a series of written projects and
short exams assigned during the semester, as well as classroom participation. The written projects may be made available for publication,
either using the Internet or in print. By enrolling in the course, you are agreeing to give perpetual, non-exclusive permission to reprint
your submitted work as well as to allow for editing of that work to allow it to conform to stylistic, length or other needs. (For example,
the written materials may appear as a resource page prepared by us on behalf of the Boston Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts or on the
Pierce Law IP Mall.)'
Use of Classroom Website: 2
A. Use of the Classroom Website:
The classroom website (Website) is a graphical bulletin board on the World Wide Web that provides references and resources
for this course. This syllabus, current reading assignments, Internet resources, law review articles and cases available on the Website
can be linked to the e-mail postings you place on the Website using an open discussion forum. Many of the course handouts and
materials will be made available through the Website. To use it, you must agree to abide by the user agreement at each site and the
requirements set out in this syllabus.
B. Protocol and Decorum
Messages sent to the Website are automatically made available to everyone who visits the Website. The list is monitored but not
moderated. This means any message you send to the list will be immediately available for all list members without human intervention.
I will read the list and participate in discussions from time to time, but the list is designed to be your vehicle to explore some of the
ideas first addressed in class.
The list is an extension of the classroom. As such, the decorum and professionalism expected of you in class extends to all
postings made to the list. I expect that you will extend the same courtesy to your fellow students on the list as you do in class. Feel free
to disagree with the ideas expressed, but work to keep the discussions polite and focused on the ideas. Please consult the student handbook
or honor code for any questions on classroom decorum.
C. Attribution of Postings
Always include your name and e-mail address in the body of your message so that others may reply to you directly. Personal
messages should be sent directly rather than to the list as a whole. Please do not send your e-mail anonymously. I believe that this
discourages both thoughtfulness and professionalism.'
If you have a question or other item that you would like posted without attribution, send the message to me directly and I will
forward it to the list if appropriate. If you send e-mails directly to me or ask questions that are of general interest, I will also edit those
questions (and my response when applicable) and forward them to the class.
D. Protection of Copyright
The [college], its students and its faculty are all required to abide by copyright law. This is both as a matter of law and law school
policy. Please respect this. The Website provides an excellent vehicle for sharing information, particularly information gleaned from other
electronic resources (such as the Internet, Lexis or Westlaw). While this is an appropriate use of the Website, please be very conservative
with respect to the amount of material that is reproduced in the e-mail. When possible, please post cites rather than significant portions of
text from any source. A fair use defense to copying should be used sparingly, if ever.
4
IJon M. Garon, Law of Motion Picture and the Performing Arts, adopted Spring 2002.
2 Jon M. Garon, Copyright Law Syllabus, adopted Fall 2001.
3 This policy is strongly debated among academics. Many instructors feel that anonymous postings allow for more open communications and more
honest responses. Given the particular subject matter, such unbridled responsiveness may be appropriate. The sample policy reflects my belief
that any benefits are outweighed by the potential for irresponsible statements that can come from anonymous postings. It might be worth noting
that the software used for this class does not require students to post their name and e-mail, so it is only the academic policy, not software, that
requires their adherence to the policy. As such, a student could choose to disregard my policy and post to the class anonymously.
4 This policy is based on the use of the Lexis Virtual Classroom. As such, all students are subscribers to Lexis, and Lexis grants permission to
post any materials in its database to any of its course Websites.
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2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act
1, sc. 2, 1. 159 (David Bevington ed., Longman) (1997).
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Options Grow, BOSTON HERALD MAG., Dec. 2, 2001, at M3.
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THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, GUIDELINES FOR GOOD
PRACTICE 11 (2000) (hereinafter GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES)
("[t]he 1999 report of the University of Illinois Faculty Semi-
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visited Mar. 15, 2002); Peterson's, at http://petersons.com/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2002). Peterson's has an affiliation
agreement with E-College, so much of its information comes
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at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/docs/de-rpt.pdf [hereinafter
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Id.
24. Brook K. Baker, Beyond Maccrate: The Role of
Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecological
Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 287, 289 (1994). See also Victor
M. Goode, There is a Method(ology) to This Madness: A
Review and Analysis of Feedback in the Clinical Process,
53 OKLA. L. REV. 223 (2000).
25. Cf Donald MacLeod, Higher Education: efor East
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Jennifer Medina, supra note 19, at B9.
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Robert C. Heterick, Jr. et al., The Public Policy Implica-
tions of a Global Learning Infrastructure, A Report from
a Joint NLII-SHEEO Symposium, pt. I (1997), at http://
www.educause.edu/nlii/keydocs/policy.html [hereinafter
Policy Implications].
28. Register's Report, supra note 23, at iv.
29. See GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 18, at
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able at http://www.aln.org/alnweb/magazine/vol2_issuel/
jorge.htm.
36. Another subset of the tools focuses on the categories
of software and capabilities available. Caviedes identifies
the following groups of technologies and tools:
1. Multimedia authoring tools for both
CD-ROM and web (well over 100 avail-
able).
2. Presentation tools and word processing
tools.
3. Virtual reality languages and environ-
ments (e.g., AlphaWorld and VRML).
4. Hypermedia languages and browsers.
5. Interactivity-enabling web programming
(e.g., Java).
6. Course structuring tools.
7. Search engines and data mining.
8. Storage and retrieval.
9. Digital watermarking.
Policy Implications, supra note 27, at pt. II.
37. Greg Sergienko, New Modes ofAssessment, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 463 (2001); Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teach-
ing Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional
Design can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 347 (2001).
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tance Education, READINGS IN DIsTNcE EDUC. 19, at http:/
/www.fcae.nova.edu/pet/simonson/monograph.PDF (last
visited Feb. 19, 2002).
39. Caviedes, supra note 35, at n.17 (citing L. K. Stemler,
Educational Characteristics of Multimedia: A Literature
Review, 6 J. OF ED. MULTIMEDIA AND HYFERMEDIA 339,339-59
(1997)).
40. For a list of degrees, including a law degree from
Concord University School of Law, masters megrees from
Penn State or the University of Phoenix, and a variety of
other degrees including, certificates, bachelor degrees, mas-
ters and doctorates, see CareerUniversities.com, at http://
www.careeruniversities.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
See DEWEY, supra note 1, at 77-112.
42. Cf Leslie T. Thornton, Beyond the Blackboard:
Regulating Distance Learning in Higher Education, 3 VAND.
J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 210, 216 (Spring 2001) (contrasting student
levels of online interaction with anecdotal evidence of passive
participation in live lectures).
43. See, e.g., University of Phoenix, at http://
www.onl.uophx.edu/whoattends.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2002).
44. See generally LEGAL IssuEs & EDUCATION TECHNOL-
OGY: A SCHOOL LEADER'S GUIDE (Edwin Dardin ed., 2001),
available at http://www.nsba.org/cosa/pubsem.
45. Several of the distance education services are
described to better frame their use before identification of the
legal issues involved in creating and protecting the content
of these sites.
1. Resource Centers. One of the proven suc-
cesses at Franklin Pierce Law Center is the "Intellectual
Property Mall," an online resource of topical materials for
students, scholars and practitioners. See Franklin Pierce
Law Center, at http://www.IPMall.piercelaw.edu (last visited
Mar. 16, 2002). The Intellectual Property Mall has become
a premiere outreach tool for the school, promoting faculty,
providing a tangible service to the public and creating a top-
quality point of contact for the press and public with Pierce
Law. A topical Internet resource center promotes continu-
ing use of the school's resources, and serves as a positive
promotional tool for educational enterprises. Essentially, the
resource center provides what the university library of the
last century provided-a place of trusted, stored knowledge
for the community.
2. Student Showcase. The Internet's low cost
of content distribution provides an excellent way for the
institution to promote the success of its students with family,
alumni and the general community. Activities can range from
online galleries for visual arts, film and music, to writing
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competitions and posted academic writings.
3. Increased Course Offerings. Distance edu-
cation creates an opportunity for institutions to allow students
to attend selected courses at other institutions, potentially
expanding the range of subjects available to them. For
specialized courses, the ability to aggregate students across
multiple campuses (or even schools) may be the only way
to guarantee that the course can be offered on a regular,
fiscally sound basis.
4. Modularized Content. Within a traditional
course, some subject components are appropriate for the stu-
dent to self-teach, while others require significant classroom
interaction. Online, interactive software can provide students
with the appropriate instructional materials, and evaluation
software can measure the competence of the student in those
materials. Properly designed, the instructional materials can
be provided selectively in response to the scores each student
receives on the evaluations, so the readings and assignments
are appropriate to the knowledge of the student.
5. Online Courses. Using chatrooms, asyn-
chronous bulletin boards and the other tools listed above,
an online course can range from providing a fully self-
directed environment to a fully interactive environment as
the instructor deems appropriate.
6. Student Portal. Portals centralize many
of the functions described above into a single interface,
customizable by the user. The user can customize his or her
welcome screen to reflect the course information for which
that student is enrolled, the activities in which that student is
interested and the Resource Center content (as well as third
party content) of interest. Portals function to centralize and
simplify content delivery to the user. For students, portals
allow a student to log into the university computer system,
read e-mail, retrieve course announcements, read posted
class materials, view campus activities and view any news,
entertainment or other content services from that student's
log-on page. For alumni and subscribers, the school can
choose to become the home portal for news and information
regarding the subscriber's areas of interest. Campus and
faculty activities can be highlighted, and substantive news,
placement opportunities for students, and other resources
can be centralized. Discussion boards could be available by
class and by area of interest or geographic location. In this
way, the school's support community would expand.
17 U.S.C.A § 102 (West 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
50. Id. § 106.
Id. § 106A.
Id. § 302(a).
Id. § 302(c).
Id.
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Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998). The application is simple: "Under the
new statute, any work that would otherwise have fallen into
the public domain on December 21, 1998, will now continue
to have copyright protection until 2018." Jon M. Garon,
Media and Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the
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& ENT. L. J. 491, 522-23 (1999).
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(West 2002). The choice to renew the copyright voluntarily
rather than by operation of law will affect the rights of the
copyright owners and transferees in those rights. Id.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994) (superceded by Pub. L. No.
102-307 § 102(g)(2)). See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright
Circular 15a: Duration of Copyright: Provisions of the
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59. See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Circular 22:
How to Investigate the Copyright Status of a Work, at http:/
/www.loc.gov/copyright/circs/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2002).
60. 17 U.S.C.A. § 401(b) (West 2002).
61. Id. § 401(c). The legal requirement is that the
"manner and location [provide] reasonable notice of the
claim of copyright." Id.
62. Id. § 408. See also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright
Circular 4: Copyright Office Fees, at http://www.loc.gov/
copyright/circs/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2002). The present
fee schedule is under review and should be expected to
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dures.
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64. Id. § 412.
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66. Id.
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68. Id.
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70. Id. § 201(a).
71. Id. § 201(b).
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is made pursuant to a work for hire relationship. See id.
§ 203.
73. See Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555,
556-57 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., Danforth v.
Cohen, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991). Although the Ninth Circuit
applied the absolute requirement of the writing to § 204
transfers, the writing obligation for specially commissioned
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74. § 101.
75. See also Roberta R. Kwall, Copyright Issues in
Online Courses: Ownership, Authorship and Conflict, 18
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 1, 13 (2001); Gregory K. Laugh-
lin, Who Owns the Copyright to Faculty-Created Web
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1093, 1097 (6th Cir. 1995), rehearing denied, 1995 U.S.
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party. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)
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were protected by state law, not federal copyright law. Id.
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UCLA was not the copyright holder of handouts, examina-
tions and other written materials prepared for college students
and distributed by the faculty. While this is an open question,
the case hardly provides any basis for a contrary determina-
tion.
87. See generally 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2002).
88. See Georgia Holmes & Daniel A. Levin, Who Owns
Course Materials Prepared by a Teacher or Professor? The
Application of Copyright Law to Teaching Materials in the
InternetAge, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 165, 182 (2000).
89. Ernest Boyer, SCHOLARSHIP RECONSIDERED 28 (1990)
("[At] most four-year institutions, the requirements of tenure
and promotion continue to focus heavily on research and
on articles published in journals, especially those that are
refereed ....").
90. Id. at 50. The author suggests that to stop the oppres-
sion the over-emphasis on scholarship has caused on many
college campuses, so-called "creativity contracts" be used
that allow the individual faculty member to negotiate with
the employer for the specific types of scholarship, writing
and service activities that professor will perform. Id. The
creativity contract assumes that all scholarship is for the
institution such that it can be bargained against other services
the institution values from the faculty member. Id.
91. Arguably, these scholarship requirements are
enforced despite the need to provide students instruction.
See id. at 29.
92. Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091,
1093-95 (7th Cir. 1987); Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847
F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1988) ("We might, if forced to
decide the issue, conclude that the exception had survived
the enactment of the 1976 Act.").
93. Hays, 847 F.2d at 416.
94. Id.
95. BOYER, supra note 89, at 29.
96. Of course, the only writings on the subject are by
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the faculty members who would risk losing the independence
of their writings. While I recognize that the law is on the side
of the universities, I strongly believe that the authorship of
academic writings should not be transferred to the employer
institution. As a faculty author, my primary goal is to
promote the non-economic interests in my writings-greater
dissemination (often free of charge) and control over the
attribution and integrity of my writings. While critically
important to me as an academic, neither of these interests are
protected or recognized by copyright law, except in limited
circumstances. Cf Dreyfus, supra note 82, at 1200.
97. See Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094; see also Manning
v. Board of Trustees, 109 F. Supp.2d 976, 980-81 (C.D. IL
2000).
98. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(b) (West 2002). The technical
language of the statute suggests that the manner of adoption
of the collective bargaining agreement or copyright use
policy should provide for a signed writing by the institution
and each faculty member. While this may be incorporated
by reference into other signed documents, publication of
an unsigned policy promulgated by a university that was
not signed upon acceptance by the faculty members may
be insufficient and will not fully comport with the writing
requirements.
99. Id. § 101.
100. Thomson v. Larsen, 147 F.3d 195,200 (2d Cir. 1998);
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508-09 (2d Cir. 1991).
101. See Shira Perlmutter, Convergence and the Future
of Copyright, 24 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 163, 172-73
(2001) ("The reason for the 'bundle' of rights is the historical
accretion of responses to new uses and new technologies
(beginning with the right to make copies impelled by the
invention of the printing press).").
102. MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 10.02A, at 10-20 (1978) [hereinafter NIMMER].
103. Id. See also § 201(d)(2) ("Any of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any
of the rights specified in section 106, may be transferred ...
and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive
right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the
protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner
by this title.").
104. NiMmER at § 10.02A.
105. § 204(a).
106. See Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir.
1984).
107. Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557-58
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., Danforth v. Cohen,
498 U.S. 1103 (1991).
108. See id.
109. § 201(d).
110. See Appendix Two for an example of my non-exclu-
sive license of copyright provision.
111. For most purposes, a grant such as this would cover
the use: "By enrolling in the course, you are agreeing to give
perpetual, non-exclusive permission to reprint your submitted
work as well as to allow for editing of that work to allow
it to conform to stylistic, length or other needs?' In other
situations, however, such as students who are contributing
to a larger work or who are creating materials that may be
the source of other students' derivative works, the license
would need to be broader.
112. Grant M. Hayden, "The University Works Because
we do"." Collective Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants,
69 FoRDI L. REv. 1233 (2001).
113. Although states and the instrumentalities of states,
such as state universities, may be immune from damages
under recent Supreme Court holdings, this should not be
used as the basis for institutional planning because such a
position is intellectually dishonest and legally too unstable
to guarantee immunity from suit. The Supreme Court has
recently decided a string of cases that strip copyright holders
of their ability to sue states for copyright violations as a
result of Eleventh Amendment protection provided to the
states by the Constitution. Rodriguez v. Texas Comm'n on the
Arts, 199 F.3d 279,281 (5th Cir. 2000). See Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Exp. Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527
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U.S. 627, 634 (1999) (denying protection for patent infringe-
ments from states or state instrumentalities); Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1996) (prohibiting Congress
from abrogating state immunity). The traditional construction
of the Eleventh Amendment, however, allows prospective
equitable or injunctive relief. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
149-50 (1908). This has not yet been overturned. Also, the
situation remains in flux, and Congress has proposed an
amendment to the Copyright Act to help remedy the Court's
decisions. The Intellectual Property Protection Restoration
Act of 2001 was submitted simultaneously in both houses of
Congress. See H.R. 3204, 107th Cong. (2001), S. 1611, 107th
Cong. (2001) (providing states an opportunity to voluntarily
waive immunity or face heightened liability under a provision
enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment).
114. Laurie Stearns, Comment, Copy Wrong: Plagiarism,
Process, Property, and the Law, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 518
(1992) ("Academia takes plagiarism seriously: 'Plagiarism
is an academic capital offense, punishable by academic
death for student or faculty.' ") (quoting K.R. ST. ONGE, THE
MELANCHOLY ANATOMY OF PLAGIARISM 39 (1988)).
115. Id. at 516-17 ("Plagiarism means intentionally taking
the literary property of another without attribution and pass-
ing it off as one's own, having failed to add anything of value
to the copied material and having reaped from its use an
unearned benefit.").
116. Neil MacCormick, Institutional Normative Order:
A Conception Of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1051, 1055 (1997)
("The dichotomy between wrong and not-wrong (or between
wrong and right-in-the-sense-of-not-wrong) is the funda-
mental differentiation of actions or of intended or planned
acts in a normative order. What a person engages upon when
aiming to make normative order actual, is the task of, or
commitment to, avoiding wrongdoing.").
117. Id. at 1056.
118. See, e.g., Comment of Association of American
Publishers, Promotion of Distance Education Through Digital
Technologies, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,167, Feb. 5, 1999, at 2, avail-
able at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/disted/comments/
INIT004.PDF ("The essential principle of 'licensing' rights,
which is critical to the practical exercise of copyright owner-
ship as well as the satisfaction of user needs in a diverse
and competitive marketplace, works well for producers
and users in this marketplace and has been contemporane-
ously reaffirmed by the courts as a legitimate exercise of
copyright.").
119. See id. at 3 ("To be effective, licenses must encom-
pass the breadth of needs of the academic course and be
delivered or confirmed in a timely fashion; this has not
always been the case. Also, the problem of identification of
copyright holders remains an issue for many institutions.")
(comment of Consortium of College and University Media
Centers).
120. See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics
Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
121. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,
366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1009 (1967).
122. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1996).
123. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterps.,
471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) ("Fair use was traditionally defined
as 'a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to
use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
his consent.' ") (quoting H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)).
124. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976).
125. See id.
126. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
576 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236
(1990)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
127. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550-51 (discussing
defense as it applied to unpublished works before and after
the 1976 Copyright Act).
128. By way of anecdotal example, at a recent conference
where I spoke on issues of faculty ownership of content
and copyright, another of the speakers later demonstrated
his highly effective chemistry website. Although all of
his scientific work was original to him, he used thousands
of images culled from various magazines to illustrate his
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webpages. He would never dream to have plagiarized another
professor's research even as he took pride in the quality of
his unauthorized reproductions. (The name of the institution
is omitted, although I did speak with legal counsel for the
institution.)
129. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West 2002) (the purpose
of the copying may be public distribution rather than the
more modest distribution to students engaged in academic
activities).
130. Posting a copyrighted work to a website would com-
prise a reproduction, distribution and display of the work.
Id. § 106.
131. Id. § 107.
132. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 ("The crux of the
profit/nonprofit business distinction is not whether the sole
motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price.").
133. See id. This suggestion is not a legal presumption
and may be factually overshadowed. See Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576-78 (1994) (commercial
nature of the use not dispositive because of the transformative
use to which the parody song was put). See also Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,455 n.40
(1984) (recording entire copyrighted television shows may
be fair use under the Copyright Act); Recording Indus. Ass'n
v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th
Cir. 1999) (non-commercial use by a consumer to record
music exempt from copyright liability, illustrating the fair
use of such recording).
134. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Dis-
tribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1176 (E.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that
the use of unlicensed clip art was not fair use). The court
described the organization's website thusly:
It is also undisputed that [the organization]
uses its Web Page for the commercial purposes
of promoting the association (whose members
pay dues) and generating advertising revenue.
The clip art files enhanced the Web Page and
furthered these commercial purposes; they
were clearly not placed on the Web Page for
the purposes of criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.
Id. at 1175.
135. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.,
758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
136. See id. at 1536-37.
137. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document
Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996); Dushkin Pub.
Group, Inc. v. Kinko's Service Corp., 136 F.R.D. 334, 335
(D.D.C. 1991). See also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
138. As a practical matter, faculty members have also
learned that some students will invariably print every page,
resulting in printing fees that may be quite higher than the
fees incurred if a course pack or textbook was assigned.
139. See infra note 214 regarding potential liability for
linking.
140. Cf Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Bleem, 214
F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) (unauthorized use of screen shot
from personal video game); Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet,
Inc., 164 F. Supp.2d 688, 695-96 (D. Md. 2001) (allowing
users to upload or download images without consent of the
images' originators); Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167,
1176-79 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (involving dispute as to whether the
transmission of requested information in electronic form
through the RAM of a computer constituted copying); Play-
boy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 552-53
(N.D. Texas 1997) (electronically reproducing, distributing
and displaying protected images via download).
141. Id.
142. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 1786, at *17 n.29 (9th Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that the inline linking of full-sized images from the
website of a third party constituted infringing display of
those images).
143. See H.R. RnPE. No. 1476, at 68 (1976) (the guidelines
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were incorporated into the legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act). See also Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
144. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 68 (1976). The guideline
is part of a series available through the Copyright Office.
See also U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Circular 21:
Reproductions of Copyrighted Works by Educators and
Librarians, at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/circs/ (last
visited Mar. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Copyright Circular 21].
145. Basic Books, Inc., 758 F. Supp. at 1536; H.R. REP.
No. 1476, at 68.
146. Basic Books, Inc., 758 F. Supp. at 1536.
147. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 68.
148. Among law schools, Western State University Col-
lege of Law in Fullerton, California represents the only for-
profit law school approved by the American Bar Associa-
tion. It is, however, presently only provisionally approved.
Thomas Jefferson School of Law had been the first such
law school to receive provisional American Bar Association
approval. (Thomas Jefferson had formerly been a separately
accredited branch of Western State and has since reorganized
as nonprofit, educational institution.) Western State is wholly
owned by Argosy University. Concord School of Law, the
only online law school, has not yet received accreditation
by either the State Bar of California or the American Bar
Association.
149. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (" [C] ommercial use of copy-
righted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of
the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright."). Cf Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 576-78 (1994) (stressing that the presumption of
unfairness from Sony remains only one of the factors to be
balanced in fair use, and it may be overcome if the usage
is transformative).
150. Basic Books, Inc., 758 F. Supp. at 1530-31.
151. The Classroom Guidelines were adopted well before
website uses were contemplated. The copying provision,
however, remains applicable. "Multiple copies (not to exceed
in any event more than one copy per pupil in a course) may
be made by or for the teacher giving the course for classroom
use or discussion." See Copyright Circular 21, supra note
144, at 8. If the website is open to the public rather than
limited to the students, however, the potential exists for
many more copies to be reproduced and distributed than is
permitted under the Guidelines.
152. See Appendix Two.
153. The preamble to § 106 provides that the rights enu-
merated are "subject to sections 107 through 121," which
embody most of the limitations on the exclusive rights of
the copyright holder. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2002). In
addition, there are other miscellaneous provisions that limit
the copyright holder's ability to bring a copyright action,
such as § 1008, which eliminates the infringement action for
non-commercial recording of music. § 1008.
154. § 110(1).
155. Id. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 85-86. The statute
distinguishes between the ability to perform the works and
the ability to transmit the works, which is subject to § 110(2).
The National School Board Association Guide states that
"devices for amplifying sound and for projecting visual
images" fall within § 110(1) which is consistent with the
public performance rights, so long as the sound or image
is not transmitted to another location. See DARDEN, supra
note 45, at 75.
156. § 110(1).
157. A related section provides for nonprofit public perfor-
mances of nondramatic literary or musical works performed
for charitable purposes. This provision essentially exempts
schools, churches and other organizations from paying royal-
ties on school concerts and similar activities. See id. §
110(4). This section allows permission to perform the music
or readings so long as the copyright owner does not object
and either there is no admission charge or the profits are
dedicated to the tax-exempt activities of the organization.
Id.
158. The copying into PowerPoint may still be fair use
under § 107.
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159. § 110(2).
160. See Marybeth Peters, Reg. of Copyrights, Testimony
Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 487, 107th Con-
gress 1st Session, Mar. 13, 2001 (presenting the views of the
Copyright Office on the "Technology, Education, and Copy-
right Harmonization Act"), at http://www.lcweb.loc.gov/
copyright/docs/regstat03l30l.html.
161. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304, § 403, 112 Stat. 2860, 2889 (1998).
162. Id.
163. See Register's Report, supra note 23, at 7.
164. Id.
165. Twenty-First Century Distance Learning Enhance-
ment Act, H.R. 2100, 107th Cong. (2001).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996).
170. Id. at 261.
171. Id. Cf Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417,435 (1984) ("Vicarious liability is imposed
in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contribu-
tory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem
of identifying circumstances in which it is just to hold one
individually accountable for the actions of another.").
172. Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F. 3d. at 262.
173. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt.,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
174. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1022-24 (9th Cir. 2001).
175.. Id. at 1024.
176. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1020; Fonovisa, Inc., 76
F.3d at 264.
177. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1020; Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("whether Netcom
knew or should have known of" infringement); Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
845-46 n. 29 (11th Cir. 1990).
178. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1019.
179. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Supp. 2002).
180. Id. § 512(k) (The term service provider is defined
as "a provider of online services or network access, or the
operator of facilities therefore" along with certain additional
activities related to the telecommunications components
described in § 512(a)).
181. Id. § 512(a)-(b), (k).
182. Id. § 512(c).
183. Id. § 512(c)(1).
184. Id. § 512(c)(2).
185. Id. § 512(g).
186. Such a policy may be limited for a state institution
which must also comport its take-down and access policies
with its obligations under the First Amendment. A state
institution may be obligated to allow a user to comply with
the counter-notification provisions of § 512(g) and limited
in the futher action it can take against the content of the
speaker.
187. Id. § 512(e).
188. Id. § 512(e)(1)(a).
189. Id. § 512(b)-(c), (e).
190. See Panel Discussion, The First Amendment in
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Cyberspace: Use of the Internet in the College Community,
17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 205 (1997) (discussing intersection
of defamation, obscenity, Megan's Law and other complex
content issues on college campuses and the Internet).
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 559 (1977). Under
California law, "libel is a false and unprivileged publication
by writing.., which exposes any person to hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned
or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his
occupation." CAL. CIv. CODE § 45 (West 2002).
192. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting) (a "[d]efamed private citizen had
to prove only a false publication that would subject him to
hatred, contempt or ridicule.").
193. Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61
(2d Cir. 1980) (" [O]ne who repeats or otherwise republishes
defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally
published it.") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
578 (1977)).
194. At common law, two different results would occur
if the republication was done by the publisher or if the
republication was passive, such as by a bookseller who
distributed the two works. In the early Internet libel cases,
the analogy seemed to depend on the amount of editorial
control retained by the ISP or bulletin board. Compare
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (no liability because bulletin board system
provides no means of control over postings), with Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy, 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 1796-97
(BNA) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding liability where Prodigy
provided a "family oriented" mediated service). See Jonathan
A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability
for Online Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the
Communications Act, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 647, 652 (2000).
195. Friedman & Buono, supra note 194, at 650 ("[A]n
entity that distributes but does not exercise editorial control
over defamatory material may only be liable if such entity
knew or had reason to know of the defamation (i.e., distributor
liability). News vendors, bookstores, and libraries generally
qualify for this standard of liability.").
196. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
198. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 2002).
199.
200.
Id. § 230(c)(1).
Id. § 230(f)(2).
201. Id. § 230(f)(3).
202. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333
(4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). The Zeran
Court explained the reasoning for its expansive view of §
230 as follows:
More generally, notice-based liability for inter-
active computer service providers would pro-
vide third parties with a no-cost means to
create the basis for future lawsuits. When-
ever one was displeased with the speech of
another party conducted over an interactive
computer service, the offended party could
simply 'notify' the relevant service provider,
claiming the information to be legally defama-
tory. In light of the vast amount of speech com-
municated through interactive computer ser-
vices, these notices could produce an impos-
sible burden for service providers, who would
be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing
controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive
liability. Because the probable effects of dis-
tributor liability on the vigor of Internet speech
and on service provider self-regulation are
directly contrary to § 230's statutory pur-
poses, we will not assume that Congress
intended to leave liability upon notice intact.
203. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc.,
206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992
F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652E (1977).
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205. JON M. GARON, INDEPENDENT FILMMAKING: THE LAW
& BuswIEss GUIDE TO MAKING DIGITAL AND INDEPENDENT FILMS
11(2002).
206. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 (1967).
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 625B (1977) ("One
who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.").
208. See, e.g., Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal.
App. 3d 118, 124-26, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 767 (Cal. App. 1st
Dist. 1983).
209. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering 2001).
210. Id. § 3344. The statute also provides for $750.00 in
statutory fees and injunctive relief.
211. KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 78 Cal. App. 4th 362,368,
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 718 (2d Dist. 2000) (holding that use
of models' photographs on subscription website constituted
actionable violation of CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344, and thus not
preempted by federal copyright laws).
212. Id.
213. "A core feature of the Web is 'hypertext' links. A
link, often represented by a colored textual icon or graphic
image, allows a user to 'click' on a designated area of the
screen and transfer to the home page of another website,
perhaps located on the other side of the world." Frank C.
Gomez, Misappropriation: Washington Post v. Total News,
Inc., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 22 (1998).
214. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("Further, hyperlinking does not itself
involve a violation of the Copyright Act (whatever it may do
for other claims) since no copying is involved, the customer
is automatically transferred to the particular genuine web
page of the original author. There is no deception in what is
happening. This is analogous to using a library's card index
to get reference to particular items, albeit faster and more
efficiently."); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("Copyright law protects an author's expression;
facts and ideas within a work are not protected.").
215. Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5669 (defendant Free Republic was asked by The
L.A. Times and The Washington Post to link to articles rather
than reproduce the articles in full as it had done for the
Jewish World Review, as a way to use plaintiffs content in
a non-infringing manner).
216. See 280 F.3d 934,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1786 (9th
Cir. 2002).
217. Id. at 944.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 945 ("By inline linking and framing Kelly's
images, Arriba is showing Kelly's original works without
his permission.").
221. See Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1344, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553, at
*7-8 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
222. Id. at *8.
223. Frank C. Gomez, supra note 213, at 22.
224. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 944.
225. See Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., 97
N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1190 (S.D.N.Y., complaint filed Feb. 20, 1997)
(under a settlement agreement, Total News agreed to remove
its frames, but retained the right to link to the plaintiff's
news content).
226. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 944.
227. "Search engines look for keywords in places such as
domain names, actual text on the web page, and metatags."
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertain-
ment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Metatags are HTML code intended to describe
the contents of the web site. There are differ-
ent types of metatags, but those of principal
concern to us are the 'description' and 'key-
word' metatags. The description metatags are
intended to describe the web site; the keyword
metatags, at least in theory, contain keywords
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